IJCentral: International Justice Central

Post- revolutionary Elections

Egypt’s first free elections since the fall of Hosni Mubarak began last week as voters from nine governorates including Cairo and Alexandria went to the polls to elect candidates for the lower house of Parliament. This event is the first time in several decades that Egyptians have been able to do so; under Mubarak, elections were constantly rigged for members of his National Democratic Party to remain in power. The turnout rate of 70 percent came as no surprise to the vigorous population that was able to overthrow an authoritarian leader in the collective desire for democratic reform. Voters from the remaining districts will vote on December 14th and again on January 3rd. With voters electing leaders based on party platforms and ideologies, their choice will be based on ideas they wish to see implemented. During the revolution, Egyptians were united on common human rights goals: “Bread, Freedom and Social equality”. How these needs will now take form differs from party to party.  Egypt is now beyond its “honeymoon phase” of revolution and now the path to democracy begins as elections are gradually breaking down society into different multifarious factions.

The elections followed several tense days of uprisings in Cairo’s Tahrir Square against the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) where Egyptians expressed discontent with the prolonged military interim rule and its attempts to claim permanent powers allowing it to intervene in civilian politics and to preserve its current rights (such as protection from public scrutiny) under the constitution. The ruling force, headed by Field Marshall Hussein Tantawi, is widely seen as a remnant of Mubarak’s rule, and therefore, undermines the purpose of the January 25th movement to abolish the tyrannical ruling power. More strongly present than the leadership traces of Mubarak’s regime were the physical tear gas canisters used against the protestors. These “non-lethal” weapons that were used to suppress the protestors are the same ones that have been imported and used throughout the post-Nasser era. Since Sadat’s open door policy, Egypt has been a heavy recipient of U.S. military aid and foreign investment.

Stability at the expense of Social Justice

U.S. manufacturers are granted export licenses by U.S. government agencies such as the Departments of State and Commerce. In considering this military aspect, what exact role does the U.S. play in the Middle East revolutions? My previous writings have examined its intervention in Libya, its stance against Syria, and its destruction in Iraq. In Egypt, it is indirectly complicit in the killings of hundreds of protestors in the revolution, through the sale of arms. Ending its contracts to the Egyptian military—the second-highest recipient of U.S. aid after Israel—would be strategically and financially unrealistic. At the same time, on the Egyptian end, this policy would end the last vestige of stability at a financially and politically tumultuous moment in its transition. But in a country where stability is equated with the former and corrupt regime, should “stability” trump justice?

In the midst of these concerns, anxiety was raised around the parliamentary elections—were they even possible in the midst of this chaos? Yet the turnout on November 28th showed the people’s cooperation in what is perhaps the quickest option for transition to civilian rule, i.e. the election of civil leaders. In light of the results of just the first round of elections, Egypt’s military rulers stated they would control the process of writing a constitution and maintain authority over the interim government to keep in check the power of Islamists who have shown a significant lead. Their claim was that as it stands, the parliament does not represent all Egyptians –not that protestors think the army represents their own interests at all. This was done in the presence of mostly foreign journalists and is a means for the army to maintain its interests with and support from the U.S.

This act by the army once more brings the moral question of social justice versus stability. Clearly, with an Islamist electoral landslide, there are fears that a pluralistic, inclusive system might not be achieved. There are also views that the shift of the Muslim Brotherhood from opposition group to leading force in power would necessitate its acceptance of a more moderate platform for state administration. Many secular and liberal Egyptians have been shocked to learn of the far-reaching support for the right-wing Salafi religious group. In that case, a military supervision of the constitutional procedures might ensure that the constitution would protect the rights of all members of society and not be biased toward a fundamental Islamic interpretation or exclude minorities such as Christians. In justifying the army’s stance, General Mulla stated, “We have a lot of other factions such as workers, farmers, engineers and doctors who are not in Parliament.” But the acceptance of the interference of the military regime in political affairs would also undermine the democratic values that Egypt aims to acquire post-revolution and once more explores the conflict of social justice versus stability. Stuck between Scylla and Charybdis, what will Egyptians do?

Foreign Policy: Should Political Islam be feared?

With the Muslim Brotherhood and more conservative factions gaining the lead in the elections, questions have been raised about possible shifts in Egyptian foreign policy. Would the next leadership end the peace treaty with Israel? Will Egypt continue to receive foreign investments which sustain the top tier of society but bypass the economic needs of the lower classes? How will Egypt’s role in the “peace process” be affected—will it continue to serve a passive role and prolong the status quo in Israel? All these are questions where stability and social justice come into conflict, and where the next leaders of Egypt will have to make important decisions. Some leading presidential candidates have confirmed that Egypt would maintain its ties to the U.S. and Israel, explaining that faced with its current national tumultuousness, Egypt cannot significantly alter its foreign policy.

One must look at events in retrospect and compare the worst fears with those of the past. Thirty years of oppression, corruption, economic and social injustice have (almost) been done away with. Whatever government emerges, it will be held accountable to the people. It will be elected for short, 4-5 year terms, after which it can run for reelection. With new democratic policies in place, any government not supported by the people will not be reelected. However, undermining this democratic process from the beginning—before even waiting to see the final results of the elections which should be evident during the first weeks of January—will sabotage the nascent democratic system in Egypt. It is clearly an example of the military rule acting on fears, not facts. What should be done at least for now is to wait for the final result of the elections.

The January 25th Revolution, while emanating from different classes of society and expressing socioeconomic and political concerns shared by all under an oppressive state, only really saw a heavy participation of the urban population that was able to sustainably fight for the rights of Egyptians. What they fought for was democracy, meaning the voicing of the opinion of citizens from other areas who generally have more conservative views, and whose participation in the elections has brought out this overwhelmingly conservative turnout. Whether the military should and will intervene in the constitution writing in order to, as they claim, make it more inclusive, might open another chapter of uprising.  What can, however, be learned from the past is that stability at the expense of the dignity and social justice of the people cannot be sustained for long.

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