IJCentral: International Justice Central

Concessions since Uprising

Uprisings started 10 months ago in Yemen to demand an end to chronic poverty, rampant corruption and lack of economic opportunity characteristic of the 33-year long rule of its president, Ali Abdullah Saleh. When Mr. Saleh first became Yemen’s president in 1978, the country had suffered two decades of civil war and violence. Mr. Saleh, a former military officer with little formal education is said to have consolidated his power over the years by dividing or co-opting rivals and building a patronage system that he alone controlled, leaving Yemen with a barren political environment and hollow institutions. Since the uprisings against his authoritarian rule started in February, the president has made gradual concessions while still remaining in power. He called for a national unity government, an offer that was turned down. In February, he declared, as did the former Egyptian president prior to his ouster, that neither he nor his eldest son, Ahmed, head of the elite Republican Guard, would run for the next election. This echoed a false claim in 2005 when Mr Saleh promised not to run again, only to change his mind the year after.

On March 20, Mr. Saleh fired his cabinet as demonstrations against him grew. On March 21, some members of his regime such as army commanders and one of the country’s most important tribal leaders began supporting protesters and called for Mr. Saleh’s immediate ouster. Several Yemeni officials resigned from the government, including the mayor of the southern city of Aden. On April 23, Mr. Saleh said he would accept a shift of power to his deputy 30 days from the signing of a formal agreement and grant him and his family, who occupy key positions in Yemen’s security apparatus, immunity from prosecution. This proposal was agreed upon seven months later.

Behind the November 23rd agreement

Seeking an exit strategy, it seems President Ali Abdullah Saleh sought to learn from Yemen’s history and to avoid the fate of the two presidents who had preceded him, both having been assassinated. Saleh signed the U.S.-backed power-transfer deal, brokered by neighboring countries, on November 23rd in the Saudi capital of Riyadh. The deal allows Mr. Saleh to retain his title and certain privileges until new elections are held. Yemeni lawmakers are also expected to pass a law granting him immunity from prosecution. The agreement officially transferred power to his vice president, Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi. Other terms of the agreement include holding elections for a new president set for February 21, 2012 and the creation of a military committee to tackle Yemen’s problems and to “end all of the armed conflicts.” The agreement shows progress in responding the protestors’ demands for democratic transition, as it is the first time Mr. Saleh actually consented to give up formal authority. Yet, questions still remain surrounding other remnants of the regime, as his son and three of his nephews retain powerful posts in the military and intelligence service. While the agreement certainly makes issues at hand, such as Saleh’s avoidance of this fate, easier, it is still unclear as to whether this proposal eases or complicates the Yemeni transition to democracy.

Mr. Saleh’s interest in accepting this proposal is multi-faceted.  One motivation for him to concede power was due in part to threats of sanctions by world powers, in the face of Saleh’s apparent intransigence. Other aspects included financial and travel restrictions; Mr. Saidi, the former United Nations ambassador, said Mr. Saleh had been warned that the Security Council would consider freezing his family assets, and that he might be banned from travel and referred to the International Criminal Court.  Mr. Saleh and his family are believed to have hundreds of millions of dollars in bank accounts and real estate in the United States and Europe. A potential travel ban might have been especially troubling to Mr. Saleh, who may need more treatment for serious wounds sustained in a bomb attack on his presidential palace on June 3rd.

Non-universal Justice
The November 23rd agreement is a favorable exit strategy for the Yemeni president, but what about the Yemeni people? Many protesters in Sana’s “Change Square” said they felt that their popular revolt had been hijacked by political elites and their foreign backers, and were angered by reports that the president and his family would receive immunity from prosecution. Nobel peace laureate Tawakkul Karman was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize this year, along with two other women, for her role in the protest movement that sought Saleh’s ouster. Showing her disapproval of the terms of the treaty agreement, she is advocating for the president’s accountability for crimes committed, stating, “I promised the people in Yemen ... that after they announced I won the Nobel Peace Prize that the first job I will do is taking the file of crimes of Ali Saleh to the ICC”. She is backed by tens of thousands of protesters in Yemen, who have distanced themselves from the formal opposition movement. While Karman has urged the International Criminal Court prosecutor to launch an investigation into the violent crackdown on dissent in Yemen by Saleh, at the same time, she acknowledges the small prospects for this to actually happen, as Yemen is not a signatory state to the Rome Statute, the court’s founding treaty. The only way the prosecutor could launch an investigation is through a recommendation by the United Nations Security Council, as was the case in Libya.
Based on current Yemeni legislation, it seems that crimes beyond those of the president and his family are to go unpunished. On November 27, Mr. Saleh declared a general amnesty for those who had committed wrongdoings during the uprising since it began 10 months ago. It was unclear whether he meant to pardon his own forces accused of killing protesters, or fighters commanded by his rivals during months of bloody fighting. Not exempted from prosecution, however, were those tied to the bombing on his presidential palace in June. Saleh called for those “groups or parties or individuals” responsible to be brought to justice. The incident left him with severe burns to his face and arms and he was taken to Saudi Arabia for treatment.

Future Effects of Yemen’s Revocation of ICC Ratification

The potential role of the ICC in prosecuting crimes in Yemen has taken on a mysterious turn. Back in 2000, Yemen signed the Rome Statute. Following this on March 24, 2007, the Yemeni House of Representatives voted in favor of ratification of the Rome Statute, which would make Yemen a state party to the ICC and place it under the court’s jurisdiction. Yet, in the subsequent procedure of having the president approve the ratification or call for a revote by the Parliament, the Yemeni Parliament voted against the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, retracting the majority vote that had been put in place for it on March 24, 2007. Those who voted against ratification claimed that it was contradicting the constitution and Islamic Sharia, yet rumors have stated that the overwhelming majority of the ruling party had received instructions from President Saleh to cancel their previous vote for the agreement. In light of this recent agreement on November 23rd to grant immunity for President Saleh, one can probably understand the reasons behind the vote back in 2007.  Based on the current terms of the agreement for Saleh’s ouster, only justice without accountability has been achieved, and the viability that this impunity allows for a democratic transition shall be tested in future months as a new government is set to emerge.

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