IJCentral: International Justice Central

El Salvador did not sign the International Criminal Court (ICC) Statute, but participated actively in the Rome Conference in 1998. Since the ICC came into effect, El Salvador has not participated in the meetings and has adopted a negligent attitude towards the Court, including the adoption of a bilateral agreement with the U.S. by which both parties agreed that their nationals would not be transferred to the ICC if they commit crimes under the Court’s jurisdiction.
But, in 2010, things began to change: mid and high level officials of the Salvadorian government participated in official meetings, a number of events were organized within the country and ICC officials paid several visits. This provoked such remarks from the Salvadorian Minister of Foreign Affairs, who stated that the visits of ICC officials served “to continue the phase of consultation and technical input from experts, interested organizations and institutions that specialize in the subject in order to enrich the discussion and allow a period of more fruitful legislative discussions and with stronger evidence to establish the necessary consensus concerning membership or non-membership of El Salvador to this important instrument in guaranteeing human rights worldwide.”
Salvadorian officials argued that in order to become party to the ICC, the National Constitution had to be amended. NGOs and academics worked on different proposals and submitted them to the government. The most important challenge identified by NGOs was related to the statute of limitations for international crimes, the amnesties and immunities.
However, a few weeks ago, the Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that the ratification bill- currently at the Executive Branch- was going to be sent to the Legislative branch for vote. The Minister said that the country would join the ICC, but will make some “reservations”. What the Minister did not know is that the Statute does not accept reservations: states must accede ‘entirely’ to the Statute.  He highlighted that the ‘reservations’ that will be made are related to the retroactivity of the ICC statute and to life imprisonment. Another mistake: the ICC Statute is crystal clear on article 24. The ICC jurisdiction is non-retroactive. In terms of life imprisonment, that punishment is currently being discussed by the judicial branch, because, although it is not legal under the Salvadorian system, people do spend their lives in prison.
Therefore, the reservations highlighted by the Minister are not legally accurate.
Willingness

We aknowledge the willingness of the government to become party to the Rome Statute and the momentum: a few years back, it would be been unthinkable to see a Salvadorian official speaking highly of the ICC. It was simply ignored. Still, education and training on the Rome Statute is a must- do in the country.

The Rome Statute system is an exceptional mechanism. The Court will only act against the most serious crimes and it’s the duty of the national courts to address crimes committed within their territory. The Court will only act, if national courts are unwilling or unable- the ratification can serve as a step and a contribution to strengthen the judicial system and the Rule of Law.

Hopes are high, and 2012 will be remembered as the twentieth anniversary of the adoption of the peace agreements, which ended the 12-year long armed conflict. It also marks the first time a Salvadorian president asked for forgiveness for the crimes committed in the Mozote Massacre.

Belissa Guerrero Rivas is a Salvadorean Lawyer.
Mariana Rodriguez Pareja is the Director of the Human Rights Program at Asuntos del Sur (ADS) Twitter handle: @maritaerrepe

This year is very signitifative for the International Criminal Court (ICC): the tenth anniversary of the entry into force, the beginning of the term-in-office of the new Chief prosecutor Fatou Bensouda, who will replace Argentine-born Luis Moreno Ocampo; and the first ruling in history for the case against Thomas Lubanga, for the recruitment of child soldiers in the Democratic Republic of the Congo was rendered in March.

As of today, 121 countries have ratified the treaty and the ICC is currently investigating 14 cases in 7 different countries. Regardless all the advances, we believe that there are many challenges to be faced and other obstacles to be undercome. One central issue of the ICC is cooperation, something that could seem superfitial for those who are not familiar with the ICC, but it is fundamental for the ICC. Without cooperation, the ICC cannot act effectively.

The ICC and the OAS

Both the ICC and the IACHR (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights)  pursue one common goal: the erradication of impunity for human right violations. After the adoption of the Rome Statute of the ICC in 1998, several resolution promoting and supporting the ICC have been adopted by the OAS, as well as a draft model-legislation to contribute OAS member States in the implementation of principles and cooperation mechanisms. The adoption of a Cooperation Agreement on April 26, 2012 is a significant push towards the strengthening of this relationship.

According to the information provided by the IACHR, the agreement “provides for the possibility that each party will provide the other with information on decisions, resolutions, judgments, reports, and documents, which could prove useful in processing cases and carrying out the mandates of both institutions. 

Why is cooperation central to the ICC? The ICC is a judicial institution and the jurisdition is complementary to the one of the States parties to the Statute. The ICC does not have its own police or armed forces and it does not have its own prisons. Therefore it is critidal for the ICC to be able to rely and count on States or international institutions in order to carry out its mandate effectivetly. Cooperation implies much more than the signing of an agreement with the IACHR. When the ICC signs a cooperation agreement with a State, it involves the adoption of cooperation laws at the moment of implementing the Rome Statute in the local system.

It cannot be ignored that the international financial crisis has an impact at every level, including the ICC- so, in order to maximize efforts and resources, cooperation must be pursued and put into practice. The Court should be able to rely on existing effective both infrastructure and mechanisms.

The Inter American System

The Inter American system has been understimated for many countries. Other countries, simply forget it exists or do not follow the rulings. Even in many Law schools in the region, the IA system is excluded from the syllabus, leaving the matter to experts only, when it should be a system widely known by every person- since the Inter American Convention for Human Rights serves as one of the basic HR instruments for all States parties to the OAS.

Despite the lack of comprehensive legislation on International Criminal Law in most of the OAS states, many of its core principles are already binding on them through the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights and the rulings of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. This regional tribunal has significantly contributed to the prosecution of crimes against humanity, especially enforced disappearances and torture.
Although the cases examined by the Inter-American Court are different from those that fall within the jurisdiction of the ICC, the Rome Statute has been a valid interpretative tool to determine State duties regarding the protection of human rights.

The ICC and the IACHR is definitely a good match: now let’s make sure all the OAS states become parties to the ICC system and that they both commit and achieve their goal to put an end, prevent and/or punish to the worst crimes and bring justice to victims.

*Mariana Rodriguez-Pareja. Director of the Human Rights Program at Asuntos del Sur (ADS). Twitter handle: @maritaerrepe

Salvador Herencia-Carrasco. LL.M. University of Ottawa, legal adviser to the Andean Commission of Jurists. Email: (JavaScript must be enabled to view this email address)

Mariana Rodriguez Pareja and Salvador Herencia Carrasco join JiC again with this fascinating guest-post on Guatemala’s ratification of the Rome Statute and the country’s ongoing legal and political struggles to address the past and achieve justice.

Ratification done, implementation next?

On April 2, 2012, the Guatemalan government filed the depository instrument of the Rome Statute before the United Nations, becoming the 121 State Party of the International Criminal Court (ICC). With this ratification, Cuba, El Salvador and Nicaragua are the only Latin American countries that are yet to be a part of the ICC. The good news is that El Salvador has publicly announced its intention to ratify the treaty by the end of the year.

In 2002, the Guatemalan Constitutional Court rendered an Advisory Opinion concluding that the Rome Statute was compatible with the Political Constitution. Since then, objections towards the treaty have been political, rather than legal. With the ratification of the Rome Statute, the long road towards implementation begins. Indeed, we it is important to bear in mind that countries like Bolivia, Ecuador, Mexico and Peru (to name a few) have ratified the treaty many years ago but have yet to fully implement the Rome Statute.

In the case of Guatemala, the importance of this ruling resides in the fact that the Constitutional Court determines that the Rome Statute is a human right treaty which, according to Article 46 of the Constitution, has the highest legal standing, forming part of the bloc de constitutionalité. This means that the Rome Statute and the principles it stands for have Constitutional standing in Guatemala. In a country that is dealing with the prosecution of international crimes perpetrated during its Civil War, principles such as non-statutory limitations, the non-applicability of amnesties or the validity of immunities might contribute in the local judicial proceedings.

Like many Latin American countries, the Guatemalan Criminal Code criminalizes torture and enforced disappearances. These crimes were adopted in 1995 and concern the fight against organized crime, rather than the fulfillment of International Human Rights Law or International Criminal Law. The Criminal Code also has a section on international crimes including genocide, where racial groups are excluded and a generic norm called ‘offenses against duties to humanity’ (deberes contra la humanidad), which seeks to regulate all violations of the Geneva Conventions and International Humanitarian Law.

(Photo: RNW/Flickr)

National Prosecution of Dos Erres Massacre: slowly but surely

On 2 August 2011, a local tribunal in Guatemala City sentenced four former soldiers from an elite unit of the Armed Forces Kaibil to 6006 years each for the massacre of Las Dos Erres. This was welcomed by the victims, their families and the international community and it served to advance the country’s process of recovery and set an important precedent for justice in Guatemala.

Nevertheless, setting another important precedent, in March 2012 a fifth soldier was sentenced for the same massacre. Pedro Pimentel Ríos was sentenced to serve 30 years of prison for each victim killed in the attack and 30 years for the perpetration of crimes against humanity.

The process against Pimentel, who was deported from the United States as an illegal alien in 2009, was advanced separately from the first mega trial. Although Guatemala’s criminal laws allows inmates to serve a maximum of only 50 years, these sentences play a symbolic role.

Former President Rios Montt appeared for the first time in a Guatemalan court in January 2012, where he will be prosecuted for counts of genocide and crimes against humanity. He is accused of ordering killings of at least 1,700 innocent Maya indigenous people during a government crackdown on leftist insurgents. General Efrain Rios Montt, who ruled the country for 17 months during the height of the violence in 1982/1983, has since been placed under house arrest and the judge announced that there was sufficient evidence for him to stand trial in Guatemala.

This marked the first time that a Latin American court has charged a former president with genocide. The fact that he was placed under house arrest and that he might be tried has been widely viewed as a huge victory for those in Guatemala who have fought relentlessly for accountability for the crimes committed under Rios Montt’s command in the 1980s.

Guatemalans protesting the disappearance of relatives during the Civil War.

The challenges ahead

Despite these significant developments, the situation in Guatemala remains shaky. The problem of organized crime is jeopardizing security, forcing the (re)militarization of the country. The ratification of the Rome Statute will hopefully instigate an open debate about the proper domestic incorporation of international crimes, as well as the adoption of a National Human Rights Plan. Considering the security problems that Guatemala is facing, due to drug trafficking and organized crime, these legal and institutional reforms should be of the highest priority.

Check out this great new video from Urgence Darfour’s “Stop Bechir” campaign. Watch the video and then sign the petition here.

The Board of Directors is accepting applications for the position of Editor-in-Chief of Eyes on the ICC, CASIN’s flagship academic journal on the International Criminal Court. Junior faculty, postdoctoral fellows, PhD candidates, law school graduates, and advanced graduate students are especially encouraged to apply. The deadline for applications is April 20, 2012.

Eyes on the ICC is the only peer-reviewed, scholarly journal devoted to the study of the International Criminal Court. It has been published since 2004 by the Council for American Students in International Negotiations, a non-profit, non-partisan organization composed of a network of students and young professionals from around the world.

Eyes on the ICC is an interdisciplinary journal that invites submissions from any field that addresses the International Criminal Court or international criminal law more generally. Past editors have come from the fields of international law, international relations, and sociology. To view current and previous volumes, please visit the journal’s website: http://www.americanstudents.us/journals/eyesontheicc/.

JOB DESCRIPTION:

The Editor-in-Chief (EIC), with the assistance of the Managing Editor (ME) and 5-7 Assistant Editors (AEs), will be responsible for producing one volume per publication year, comprised of at least five articles, with a camera-ready manuscript due on December 1. Submissions are accessed via Expresso as well as through direct e-mail contact between authors and the EIC or the ME. The EIC reports to the Publications Committee of CASIN’s Board of Directors.

Additional obligations will include:

- Assisting in managing submissions received via Expresso as well as through direct e-mail contact with ME or EIC;

- Managing the peer review process;

- Making article selection decisions based on reviews of Editorial Staff;

- Assisting with final editing of all accepted articles and assisting with intermittent contact with authors throughout selection process as necessary;

- Supervising the ME;

- Maintaining regular contact with ME (who manages most of administrative editorial process);

- Maintaining regular contact with Publications Committee of the Board, Peer Reviewers, and Editorial Advisory Board;

Please note that this is a virtual position. Work is coordinated predominantly through e-mail and other forms of electronic communication. Please also note that this position is offered without compensation.

REQUIRED QUALIFICATIONS:

- Demonstrated knowledge of the International Criminal Court and international criminal law;

- Editorial/publication experience in an academic setting;

- Experience supervising and managing others.

- Strong writing, research, and interpersonal skills;

- Comfort working closely with virtual staff and board;

- Strong communications skills and availability to respond promptly to e-mail communications;

- Strong commitment to international human rights, criminal law, and/or social justice;

- Reliable, organized, team-oriented, and able to meet deadlines.

- Master’s degree or equivalent in a related field;

PREFERRED QUALIFICATIONS:

- Experience working directly with international criminal courts and/our tribunals;

- Contacts with academics and practitioners within the international criminal law field;

- Experience with the Chicago Manual of Style and The Bluebook system of citation;

Address all questions to (JavaScript must be enabled to view this email address). Only qualified applicants will be contacted by early May 2012.

The International Peace Institute (IPI) held a panel discussion on International Justice in Times of Transition, focusing on the relationship between peace and justice in the context of recent developments and transitions throughout the world. Welcome remarks were given by Jozias van Aartsen, mayor of The Hague, and Warren Hoge, IPI senior adviser for external relations, moderated the debate.

Video streaming by Ustream

In March 2012 in cities around the world, people sat anxiously in front of their computers to focus their attention on a 30-minute video. The face of one African man became more famous than ever before as the narrator detailed his use of children under the age of 15 for brutal hostilities in Central Africa. Celebrities watched on in awe, and social media erupted with the reactions of civil society.

I’m actually not talking about the controversial “Kony2012” video by Invisible Children that has taken the word “viral” to new heights.

I refer instead to the International Criminal Court’s March 14 conviction of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo for the war crimes of conscripting, enlisting and using child soldiers in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. While Angelina Jolie looked on from the gallery, distinguished English barrister Judge Sir Adrian Fulford solemnly read out the decision detailing Lubanga’s crimes. Though the unanimous decision from the judges was in large part a stern reprimand towards the recklessness of the Prosecution, it was the defense team who seemed to shrink in their seats with every passing minute.

Despite its many setbacks and valid critiques of the case, the Lubanga decision marked the completion of the first case before the world’s first permanent international criminal tribunal. It may not have reached the 100 million or so viewers that the Kony2012 film boasts, but set against the long arc of history’s battle against impunity crimes, the Lubanga verdict will have resonance for hundreds of years to come.

The ICC is the result of a century of visionary contributors who imagined a different system to punish atrocity crimes. It’s been called the most important legal advancement since the Magna Carta. At the helm of this colossal effort have been diplomats, lawyers and academics, steered true by the compass of civil society. Today, civil society (as members of the international NGO Coalition for the ICC) continue the daily fight for an effective, fair and independent ICC, despite enormous challenges facing the Court and its 120 member states in ensuring the functionality of the Rome Statute system.

One of these challenges, perhaps the greatest, has been the cooperation of these states to assist in the arrest and transfer of ICC indictees to The Hague. Kony is just one of a handful of powerful men still at large, and even the ones who are thought to be hiding, even UCLA can’t help but run into them.

Invisible Children Takes the Stage

Rewind back to 2011. On a cold New York City night in late December, I met the founders of Invisible Children at the Justice Gala, an event where Invisible children received a Justitia award for “Civic Campaign of the Year.” The front tables were packed with the international ICC cadre of politicians and diplomatic heavy weights, who had converged for an annual meeting of the ICC’s governing body at the UN. Among them was ICC Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo, a fervent supporter of Kony2012.

The award was warranted, if only because Invisible Children is so well funded they’re hard to ignore (apparently, international diplomats and high school students alike are attracted to shiny, pretty things). The Kony2012 campaign, as introduced to the gala, was to be game-changer, a “get him once and for all” mission. I’ll admit, it was exciting: Kony was going to The Hague, no matter what. Enforcement crisis solved. And the crowd went wild.

Two months later, the romance with Kony2012 is over. The Kony2012 buzz from media and the blogsphere are nearly as staggering as the video’s hits on YouTube. The responses range from serious critique, to the woefully defensive, and at least one in the form of a drinking game.

So, it’s of no surprise that Ugandans were so outraged over the video that a Kony2012 screening turned violent, and future local screenings have been cancelled to avoid further embarrassment for Invisible Children. Last week at an international student conference about the Lubanga trial in The Hague, development veteran and head of the ICC’s Trust Fund for Victims Kristin Kalla summed it up when she said it was “clearly an American campaign, not a Ugandan one.”

The myriad of problems with Kony2012 I think has been already well articulated by these Ugandans, as well as experienced campaigners who know how to read past the hype. Now that we’ve gone round the block and the global attention span is moving on, it’s time to start asking Invisible Children about their future.

What’s next for Invisible Children?

Part of what Invisible Children has succeeded brilliantly in doing is seizing- and in some cases, sparking- a moment of education in students, an “A Ha!” moment (nowadays, more like an “OMFG” moment) where the rose-colored windows looking out at planet earth are shattered. The flood of member testimony on their website shows the genuine passion of their activists, determined to make a better world.

And really, who are we to say we were never one of them? Most of us working in international affairs or justice can remember such a moment, when the brutal reality of the suffering of others was presented for the first time. It’s only natural to seek the company of others struggling with the same question: “what can I do?” and cling to narrow campaigns with a good guy vs. bad guy narrative.

But as their young members grow up and begin thinking critically about the world beyond one weakening rebel group from Uganda, Invisible Children will have to meet their members’ desires for participating in a true movement for ending impunity for atrocity crimes. This, I believe, will come in the form of supporting new systems of ending impunity: the International Criminal Court, for one.

While the ICC is a part of the Kony2012 formula, Invisible Children didn’t always support the role of the ICC in Uganda. Initially, they took objection to the ICC in Uganda, similar to that of their anti-ICC Save Darfur counterparts, back when the notion of the ICC blocking a potential peace agreement was still quite popular. Today, it’s of no surprise to watch much of the Darfur student movement grow into a broader coalition working against genocide in many different parts of the world, naturally including robust support of a fair and effective ICC.

So, like so many organizations before them, it seems Invisible Children will seek larger impact and more critical thinking about their work.  As it has been ever-so-subtly pointed out here, in real life, “you don’t get to throw the Emperor down a shaft in the Death Star and watch all the bad guys crash and burn.” So while I think it’s safe to assume Invisible Children’s members have more intellectual capacity than Jason Russell’s Star Wars obsessed toddler, we should still press the group to take to heart the lessons from the Kony2012 critiques.

It’s time the organization ask themselves how they can help ensure the United States seeks justice for war criminals beyond the LRA.

Here’s how:

Fully Incorporate the ICC into the work of Invisible Children
Invisible Children should incorporate the ICC into all aspects of their work. Their chapters in the United States can use educational materials on the Court such as the excellent documentary film “The Reckoning” from Skylight Pictures, and collaborate with new campaigns from Amnesty International that seek the arrest of ICC indictees. Their initiatives on the ground in Uganda should seek collaboration with the many projects of the ICC’s Trust Fund for Victims in targeted communities.

Join Existing ICC Networks in the US
An essential part of seeking effective social change is finding your partners. Invisible Children could affirm their commitment to the ICC by joining the American NGO Coalition for the ICC (AMICC), coordinate their lobbying on The Hill with the Washington Working Group for the ICC (WICC), and join in on coordinated statements to lawmakers like the recent letter about the Lubanga verdict. Their student members can collaborate with the expanding ICC Student Network (ICCSN), and follow the work of the global civil society network (CICC) to keep their members informed on the activities of the Court. They can also join hundreds of global NGOs that participate as observers in the annual meetings of the ICC’s Assembly of States Parties meetings.

Engage Washington on the ICC
Though the US is not a member of the ICC, non-states parties can still have a huge impact on how cases progress. Though it is a fully developed institution, the ICC still needs a vital civil society movement to encourage the United States government to stand ready to assist the ICC. The US is now a non-party partner to support the work of the ICC, yet the US has only started to share information and resources with the ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor, a relationship which requires public support and encouragement. Invisible Children can remind President Obama and lawmakers in Washington that the ICC is helping to fight impunity for abuses against children in other conflicts around the globe, and the United States can use its influence to assist justice efforts. For example, Invisible Children can continue to support legislation like the Rewards for Justice Program and other initiatives aimed at apprehending individuals suspected of committing atrocity crimes. 

If Invisible Children reassessed how they approach their “movement” building and chooses to engage with the ICC community, their members can work to protect victims of atrocity crimes wherever they occur. By moving the US towards a future of collaboration and support of the ICC, Invisible Children can secure their place in history’s long evolution towards meaningful systems of accountability.

The recent spotlight on Joseph Kony, the Ugandan leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army charged by the International Criminal Court (ICC), underscores the outstanding ICC arrest warrants for 11 other suspects of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide related to situations in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Uganda, the Sudan, and Libya.

Click HERE to take action!

Joseph Kony, Bosco Ntaganda, President Omar al-Bashir and other fugitives are often shielded by powerful supporters and states. The ongoing lack of justice means that most of these fugitives are free to commit more crimes, placing civilians in affected areas at great risk.

The 11 with outstanding International Criminal Court arrest warrants are:

•  Democratic Republic of Congo: Bosco Ntaganda whom the ICC has charged with enlisting and conscripting children under 15. The Congolese government is shielding him following his integration into the national army.

•  Uganda: Accused Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) leader Joseph Kony and LRA commanders Vincent Otti (presumed dead), Okot Odhiambo, and Dominic Ongwen continue to evade trial after being charged with crimes against humanity and war crimes. They and the fighters they lead continue to move between the Central African Republic, north-eastern DRC and South Sudan and commit crimes.

•  Sudan: President Omar al-Bashir has been charged with genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes in the Darfur region. He has yet to be arrested despite regularly conducting state visits abroad. Sudanese officials Ahmad Harun and Abdel Raheem Muhammad Hussein and accused “Janjaweed” leader Ali Kushayb are also at large.

•  Libya: Saif al Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah al-Senussi are charged with crimes against humanity committed during the crackdown on protesters in Libya. Saif al-Islam was captured on 19 November 2011 but has not yet been surrendered to the ICC.

The UN has a critical role to play by providing political, diplomatic, and logistical support for efforts to arrest individuals named in ICC arrest warrants and to protect civilians in countries where the ICC is investigating crimes.

However, if the UN is to play a constructive role in protecting civilians and supporting the arrest of ICC fugitives, while respecting human rights, it must provide adequate resources particularly to the UN’s peacekeeping missions in the DRC, South Sudan, and for its office in the CAR.

Write to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon telling him that you support Amnesty International’s call for the UN to provide all necessary resources to its peacekeeping missions and other offices in the region to protect civilians and support the arrest and surrender of individuals named in ICC arrest warrants.

*Please note that your first name and country will be shared with the UN Secretary General but not your surname and email address. Please consider this information before taking action.

Reposted from the New York Times Op-Ed pages

Legislators play a dangerous game using the word “genocide.” In trying to appease millions of victims, they needlessly pit nations against one another. They should leave it to others to sift through the evidence and determine what killings occurred when and which ones amount to what crimes. Political judgments distort the search for truth and for justice.

Millions of people live with the memories that their ancestors were slaughtered out of prejudice. They demand that the story of their people’s past be confirmed for posterity and that the perpetrators be condemned. But judging such facts, especially many years, perhaps even centuries, after they occurred, requires the discipline of historians and, if surviving suspects can be prosecuted, of jurists.

Some nations have outlawed Holocaust denial to avoid stoking the violence bred by anti-Semitism. Such intentions may be sound, but too often the results are problematic. Legislators and governments have variously decreed or denied that given mass atrocities were genocides in order to satisfy certain interest groups or national agendas.

France and Turkey are now at loggerheads, for example, over how to characterize the deaths of some 1.5 million Ottoman Armenians nearly a century ago and whether to criminalize any refusal to call those atrocities a genocide. The French Parliament says “genocide” and wants to criminalize its denial; Turkey rejects the term and prosecutes those who use it. The Turkish prime minister has threatened sanctions against France and countered that France committed a genocide of its own in Algeria between 1830 and 1962.

Mass atrocities were indeed committed against the Armenians, but deciding to call them a “genocide” — or refusing to — is a dangerously divisive political game. It heightens tensions between countries and sows confusion about what really happened.

Politicians should use the term “genocide” only when historians and jurists have determined, based on evidence and analysis, that a genocide — a specific crime defined according to narrow factual and legal criteria — has indeed occurred. It is the responsibility of historians to establish the facts of distant events and of jurists to determine whether these were a genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, human rights abuses, political repression or other crimes against civil or political rights.

Using the word “genocide” loosely can be tragically ineffective or self-defeating. It can intimidate powerful nations from reacting quickly enough to prevent further atrocities.

The United Nations and key Western governments failed to act in Rwanda and the Balkans in the early 1990s partly because their policy makers were searching for terminological certainty about the nature of the killings. The false notion arose that invoking “genocide” would require immediate military intervention. (The 1948 Genocide Convention does not demand this; the requirement that parties to the treaty “prevent” genocide can take military, political, diplomatic or economic forms.) And while the politicians pondered, thousands of civilians continued to die.

When in 2004 Secretary of State Colin Powell declared the killings in Darfur a genocide, he wasn’t committing to United States to send the 82nd Airborne into western Sudan. He was simply trying to prod the U.S. government to take some action, ideally with others, to stop the atrocities. But others in Washington and several Western capitals froze at the use of the g-word.

Politicians would be better off using the phrase “atrocity crimes” — a term with no pre-existing connotations or legal criteria — to describe any combination of genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes, leaving it to historians and jurists to determine, free of political influence, which atrocity crimes belong to which category. In the face of ongoing mass killings, this would allow policy makers to concentrate on what needs to be done to end a slaughter rather than debate how to define it. The Obama administration is rightly creating the Atrocities Prevention Board to free up decision-making from any confining lexicon.

France, as well as the United States and Israel — both of which are considering similar genocide legislation — could call what occurred to the Armenian people a century ago atrocity crimes. (Turkey might even tolerate that.) And Turkey could condemn what the Algerians suffered at the hands of the French as atrocity crimes.

If the United States, the European Union and the Arab League declared that the Syrian government was currently committing atrocity crimes against its own people, they would have an easier time getting the U.N. Security Council to refer Syria’s leaders to the International Criminal Court for investigation, leaving it to the prosecutor to determine what crimes to list in an indictment. Rather than veto such a move, Russia and China might abstain from voting on it and give justice a chance.

By forgoing “genocide,” politicians would no doubt disappoint interest groups determined to use the label to describe the suffering inflicted on their ancestors. The Armenians, in particular, would find this compromise hard to accept. But their strongest case rests with the historians and the jurists now — not with the politicians whose loose indictments trigger the very tensions that can ignite prejudice among peoples and nations. Shifting to “atrocity crimes” in government speech, meanwhile, would focus the efforts of officials on getting more unified international responses to ongoing massacres.

——

David Scheffer, the U.S. ambassador at large for war crimes issues from 1997 to 2001, is a law professor at Northwestern University. His new book is “All the Missing Souls: A Personal History of the War Crimes Tribunals.”

This article was originally posted on Jurist.org

On January 26, 2012, Navi Pillay, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, made a statement before the UN Security Council on the current human rights situation in Libya. In her statement, she highlighted key issues related to the promotion, protection and enforcement of human rights. Pillay noted that the National Transitional Council (NTC) of Libya has taken some positive measures since coming into power in October 2011. However, she also highlighted that there had been reports of human rights abuses and that over 8,000 supporters loyal to the late leader of Libya, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, were arbitrarily detained and are being held in appalling conditions.

Pillay’s statement to the Security Council came just weeks before human rights advocacy organization Amnesty International (AI) released a report accusing the NTC of allowing the abuse and torture of supporters of former leader Gaddafi by unofficial militia. The AI report of February 16, 2012 underscores Pillay’s concerns. The report itself is a product of an AI fact-finding mission to Libya in January and February 2012. The mission visited 11 facilities in Tripoli, al-Zawiya, Gharyan, Misrata and Sirte. The facilities are all currently used as detention facilities for suspected Gaddafi loyalists.

AI’s report details systematic human rights abuses by militia of people in custody. People interviewed provided details of different forms of torture and resultant grievous bodily harm. According to the report, the alleged forms of torture used by the militia include, but are not limited to, beatings using various instruments such as sticks, whips and rifle butts. Several of the people interviewed by the AI mission said they suffered other forms of torture, including electric shocks, burns and threats of rape or death. In addition to those allegedly tortured, the mission also found that 12 detainees had died in custody.

Aid agency Medecins San Frontieres (MSF) has supported the findings of this report and Pillay’s statement to the Security Council. According to the MSF, forensic examinations of some of those who died in detention provide evidence that such methods are still being used. Furthermore, MSF reports that some of their staff were asked by the militia in detention in Misrata to patch up prisoners midway through torture sessions so they could be taken back for more abuse. MSF in January said that its doctors had treated 115 people since August 2011 who had torture-related wounds and of those two people had died.

If the reported human rights violations are true and the militia is responsible for them, then the militia has violated the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) of 1966 and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 1984, two international agreements to which Libya is a party. The ICCPR provides that everyone has the right to life and further that “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention.” In addition, both the ICCPR and the Torture Convention expressly provide that no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

Bearing this in mind, it is clear that the alleged perpetrators should be brought to book for the acts of torture and the reported deaths. The AI report recommends that the NTC abruptly put an end to the unlawful detentions and ensure that any arrests are carried out by lawful police forces, ensure humane treatment of detainees and investigate the reported deaths of prisoners. However, as noted by Pillay, the reason that these crimes have gone largely unpunished is because the NTC seems to lack the requisite systems to oversee activities across the country. Consequently, some regions are not governed by the NTC, but instead by the militia.

In 2011, the NTC vowed to investigate allegations of human rights abuses after AI released their September 2011 report, which alleged that both sides to the Libyan conflict were responsible for human rights violations. The NTC also currently has in detention International Criminal Court (ICC) accused Saif al-Islam and Abdullah al-Senussi, who they intend to prosecute domestically despite criticisms from the ICC and the international community. Indeed, to date, no efforts have been made to freely and fairly prosecute both sides to the conflict. Unfortunately, this state of affairs closely mirrors the lack of commitment to criminal justice on the part of the Gaddafi government throughout his 42-year rule. If the NTC is to establish itself as a legitimate government, it will need to address this fundamental issue as well as ensure that it has authority over areas currently controlled by different militia groups.

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Ottilia Maunganidze is a Researcher for the International Crime in Africa Programme at the Institute for Security Studies. Her main focus is on criminal justice mechanisms to deal with international crimes and the promotion and protection of human rights. Previously, she worked as a research intern for the African Security Analysis Programme, as a junior legal advisor at the Rhodes University Legal Aid Clinic, and as a student human rights education coordinator for the Rhodes University chapter of Amnesty International.

Hariri’s Assassination and the Ayyash et al. case

Last week marked the seven-year anniversary of the assassination of Lebanon’s former Prime Minister, Rafik al Hariri, whose alleged killers will be tried in absentia at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. On February 14, 2005, Hariri was killed along with 22 others by a bomb blast in the center of Beirut. Because the Lebanese government was unable to reach a national consensus on how to hold the perpetrators accountable, an external rather than domestic tribunal was deemed the best means to ensure a fair trial. The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) was established following a request by the Lebanese government to the U.N. on December 13, 2005.

Albeit a transitional institution established through international procedures such as U.N. Resolution 1757, the tribunal is a hybrid court in that it applies national law and provisions of the Lebanese Criminal Code. This is significant in that it allows for in absentia trials for the four accused members of Hezbollah: Salim Jamil Ayyash, Mustafa Amine Badreddine, Hussein Hassan Oneissi, and Assad Hassan Sabra, for whom a defense council of eight lawyers was assigned. By fulfilling its primary mandate of holding trials for the accused, the STL, with the cooperation of the Lebanese government, is meant to promote accountability and take steps toward building a peaceful society based on the rule of law. The STL has been entrusted with fair trial, but what are the prospects for fairness in this seemingly unusual case reliant on the cooperation of a politically divided Lebanon?

Trials in absentia

In absentia trials occur without the accused being physically present and are deemed fair according to Lebanese law. This procedure, seeming at first unfair for the defense, is argued to also put the prosecution at a disadvantage as his case often relies on testimony by the defendant himself. In absentia hearings are allowed by the STL’s statute if the accused has waived his right to be present, has not been handed over by the state, has absconded, or cannot be found. On February 1st, the STL Trial Chamber had reached a conclusion that “each of the four accused has absconded”. Before reaching this decision, the STL Trial Chamber affirms that it had consistently requested assistance from the Lebanese authorities to do more to locate and arrest the accused.

The precedent of in absentia trials dates back to Nuremberg, when Hitler’s secretary, Martin Bormann, was tried, convicted, and sentenced to death in his absence. Trials in absentia are also allowed by the European Court of Human Rights, and well established in the former Yugoslavia. Seen as an alternative to the prolonged and sometimes endless pursuit of war criminals which often does not bring victims due justice, in absentia trials might be an efficient and effective means of enforcing human rights.

Possible Outcomes of the in absentia Trials

Thus far, there is no telling how the STL trials will proceed past this decision. Whether or not the tribunal has come short of its purpose can probably be determined based on the possibilities of seeking punitive measures for the indictees if found guilty. Lebanon has an ongoing obligation to search for, detain and transfer the accused. If the accused are found in the course of the proceedings in absentia or if they choose to participate in the process, they may be retried in their presence. After the Trial Chamber delivers its sentence, generally speaking, the accused can accept the conviction, seek a re-trial, or appeal the conviction.

As the in absentia trials now stand, labeling the perpetrators as criminals would present a symbolic victory for the victims, as well as a measure of fighting impunity. But it is surely not a way of fully realizing the potential of the STL or allowing the victims to see justice play out in front of their eyes. At the same time, however, the STL lacks a police force as do all other international tribunals, and so a failure to arrest the accused would not attest to its own shortcomings, but to that of the state holding the accused. Can the STL effectively punish the perpetrators in the midst of Lebanon’s divided politics?

International Power Struggle, Hybrid Court and Internal Division

The STL is a court of international character that reflects international power struggles as well. The U.S.’s founding support for the tribunal at the U.N. Security Council has been seen as a political motivation to undermine Hezbollah’s upper hand in Lebanon following Israel’s 2006 war in Lebanon. Although the tribunal was founded on an agreement between the Lebanese Republic and the U.N., this agreement was not ratified by the Lebanese Parliament, as members of the Council of Ministers withdrew and formed an opposition. 

Nonetheless, the viability of this hybrid court has been sustained by Lebanon’s contributions to the STL budget, which it shares with U.N. volunteer states. Spilling in an annual payment of about $30 million, the Lebanese government has shown its commitment for justice and the rule of law. But the in absentia proceedings may be falling short of realizing the STL’s full potential and of strengthening the rule of law in Lebanon. The court, while not a direct political tool, was seen as having the potential for shifting domestic Lebanese politics away from Hezbollah’s influence.

The positive effects that the court might bring to calming civil and political tensions in Lebanon are difficult to determine, involving issues well beyond seeking a fair trial for the victims of the 2005 attack. The court’s decision to try the indictees in absentia comes amidst a regional political struggle of international significance. Should the court hold the four indicted members of Hezbollah accountable, this step toward enforcing the rule of law in Lebanon might be undermined by the ongoing power struggle posed by international players in the region, namely, the U.S. and its allies, and the Syrian and Iranian-backed Hezbollah. The failure of the Lebanese government to bring the accused to trial shows the internal political tensions between pro-Western and Hezbollah-led groups that may just be beyond Lebanon’s grasp. How this international struggle will be played out in Lebanese domestic politics is unpredictable, as the failed Western efforts to weaken the Syrian regime’s steadfast authoritarian grip have shown.

The STL was externally established in the Hague due to the factious nature of Lebanon, but it is important to note that past the in absentia trials, the perpetrators can only be fully brought to justice with the cooperation of the Lebanese government, even though the court bypassed Lebanon’s constitutional procedure. When he was alive, Prime Minister Rafik al Hariri’s domestic policy indicated his initiative toward overcoming years of Lebanese civil war through a reconstruction process. It would be truly self-defeating, therefore, to see the STL, which was conceived as a way of seeking retribution for his assassination, plunge the country into a deeper cycle of civil strife. Thus, one can only hope that whatever follows from the in absentia trials, it will not further divide Lebanon.

For more on the STL, please visit:
http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/lebanon/tribunal/timeline.shtml
http://www.stl-tsl.org/en/about-the-stl/timeline-of-events
http://www.stl-tsl.org/en/ask-the-tribunal

It’s time, once again, for a mind bending IJCentral quiz!

By Mariana Rodriguez-Pareja and Salvador Herencia-Carrasco*

There are currently 120 States Parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC but this number will increase to 121 in a few months. This Thursday, January 26, Guatemalan Parliament approved the ratification of the treaty. With this decision, Guatemala will join 15 other Latin American countries to be part of the ICC, pending similar efforts by Cuba, El Salvador and Nicaragua.

This vote was welcomed by the civil society, which has been working towards the signature and ratification of the Rome Statute for more than 10 years.

Ratification is a welcoming effort towards the future

As written before for IJCentral, Guatemala is a Latin American country shattered by violence and genocide resulting in the death of 200,000 people and victimizing an entire nation between 1960 and 1996. The report of the Guatemalan Truth Commission (Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico), concluded that government forces under the de facto presidency of General Efrain Rios Montt perpetrated more than 600 massacres, homicides, forced disappearances, and other heinous crimes, particularly against rural and indigenous communities. A quarter of a century later, the country still carries the scars of a violent past with little accountability for those responsible for systematic human right violations.

But things are changing. In an effort towards justice, in August 2011, a local tribunal in Guatemala City convicted four former soldiers from an elite unit of the Armed Forces to 6,060 years each for the massacre of Las Dos Erres, where government forces assassinated 200 people, including women and children. This has been seen as an important advance in the process of the country’s recovery and set an important precedent for justice in Guatemala.

It should be noted that despite the lack of comprehensive legislation on international criminal law and human rights in the country, many of its core principles have been already binding on the state through the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights and the rulings of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The Rome Statute and several rulings by Ad-hoc tribunals (e.g. the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda) have been used as interpretative tools for human rights organizations to claim justice before national and foreign tribunals. The most notorious case is the Spanish Audiencia Nacional, which has been trying cases on Guatemala regarding genocide, under universal jurisdiction.

What delayed the accesssion?

In a similar way to the cases of El Salvador and Nicaragua, the delay in the ratification of the Rome Statute had political, rather than legal reasons. In these cases, the argument was the fear that the ICC could investigate crimes against humanity perpetrated during the internal armed conflicts, namely enforced disappearances and torture.

In the case of Guatemala, the Constitutional Court rendered a favorable opinion in 2002 whereby no constitutional amendment is needed in order to ratify the ICC.  Nonetheless, Congress was historically opposed to ratification. Last week, upon entering into office and in his inaugural speech, President Pérez Molina, a former military General, referred to the International Criminal Court and said his administration “was willing”to become party to the Rome Statute.

In this context Congress swiftly included this issue in the agenda, adopting by 129 favorable votes, this Thursday, Decree No. 3-2012, approving the ratification of the Rome Statute. Now, the President must sign and publish the Decree for its final enactment. This is a simple procedural rule that should take place in the following days, considering that the decision to ratify the treaty came directly from the Executive Branch.

At the same time, human rights activists celebrated the fact that former President Rios Montt appeared for the first time in a Guatemalan court, where he will be prosecuted for counts of genocide and crimes against humanity. General Efrain Rios Montt has since been placed under house arrest and the judge announced that there is sufficient evidence for him to stand trial in Guatemala. This is a mighty step towards justice, and a huge victory for those in Guatemala who have fought relentlessly for accountability for the crimes committed under Rios Montt’s command in the 1980s.

ICC for the Future

When a country joins the ICC it does not exclude any other means of justice. Guatemalan and other international organizations should continue to advocate for justice for victims of atrocity crimes and genocide committed in Guatemala.

The ICC is a Court of last resort and states that become parties to the Rome Statute accept that if they are unable or unwilling to prosecute the grave crimes contained in the Statute the ICC shall apply its jurisdiction to bring those criminals to justice.

The human rights violations perpetrated for 36 years must be addressed by the Guatemalan state or by tribunals that have jurisdiction.

Guatemala’s ratification of the treaty will contribute to strengthening its judicial system and rule of law throughout the country.

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* Mariana Rodriguez-Pareja is the Director of the Human Rights Program at Asuntos del Sur (ADS). Twitter handle: @maritaerrepe

Salvador Herencia-Carrasco, LL.M. University of Ottawa, Legal Adviser of the Andean Commission of Jurists. E-mail: sherencia@cajpe.org.pe

10 years on and the ICC is yet to find its place in the world

By Mariana Rodríguez-Pareja and Salvador Herencia-Carrasco

2012 marks the tenth anniversary of the entry into force of the Rome Statute; it is an appropriate time to make a critical, yet constructive, balance of the most important international organization created since the United Nations. Needless to say, when the Rome Statute was adopted on July 17, 1998 followed by its swift entry into force on July 1, 2002, expectations were high. But it would prove impossible for a nascent and exceptional International Criminal Court (ICC) to meet the demands of human rights violations around the globe.

A decade in a nutshell

Almost 10 years after its entry into force, muchof that enthusiasm has been lost, replaced with demands for the ICC to begin to fulfill its duty. But it is not easy to create an institution from scratch, especially when the Court’s mandate is the “power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern”.

As of today, 120 countries have ratified the treaty and the voices criticizing the existence of the Rome Statute have substantially diminished. The ICC is currently investigating 14 cases in 7 different situation countries, and during the 2010 Review Conference the Crime of Aggression was adopted. The United Nations Security Council has referred the situations of Darfur and Libya, granting the ICC jurisdiction over two of the most desperate humanitarian and political crises in the 21st century. In addition, the ICC has triggered the so-called “peace vs. justice debate”, concluding that justice and peace are not in existential opposition.

Despite these significant achievements, the ICC is yet to conclude a single judgment (the ruling on the Lubanga case is expected in the coming weeks), the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) has failed to open an official investigation in any country outside Africa, despite the existence of grave situations that fall under the jurisdiction of the ICC in Latin America. Furthermore, the final drafting of the Crime of Aggression could suggest that it will take a long, long time for this crime to come into force.

In this context, 2012 could not be any less welcoming

The global economic crisis hampered the increase of its annual budget needed to conduct more investigations in the field; the last election of six ICC judges at the Assembly of State Parties showed old and bad habits by States struggling to elect their own officials and the recent release of Callixte Mbarushimana because of deficiencies in the way the OTP handled the case. These have triggered a number of criticisms towards the ICC.

Implementation and Complementarity: Who helps whom? 

One of the most important aspects in the adoption of the Rome Statute is the principle of complementarity and the need for States to adopt implementing legislation regarding international crimes and judicial cooperation with the ICC. This has prompted countries around the world, including those under preliminary examination and situation countries, to discuss and/or enact laws regarding the application of International Criminal Law, as well as the triggering of national prosecutions.

Perhaps it is Latin America where the most significant progress has been made in this field, both at the national level as well as within the framework of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Despite the fact that most cases in this region concern international crimes perpetrated outside the temporal jurisdiction of the ICC, the significance of the Rome Statute has prompted this significant judicial and legal accomplishment.

However, this cannot be considered to be enough. As a court of last resort, prosecuting only those alleged to be most responsible for committing the most heinous crimes, the ICC should also work to strengthen its role in capacity building within national judiciaries. If the Court aims to comprehensively strengthen the current international justice system and the rule of law, it must work (without compromising its independence) to ensure that State Parties are capable of investigating and prosecuting international crimes.

From Preliminary Examination to Official Investigation: No clear standard, no clues, lost efforts…

One of the major criticisms that academics and NGOs have made of the ICC and the OTP is the lack of a clear policy regarding the identification of situations that may lead to an official investigation by the Court. Although it would be impossible to harmonize standards for places as different as Afghanistan and Colombia or Palestine and Nigeria, as of now the decision to open an investigation seems to reside on elements outside the sole legal framework of the Rome Statute.

Colombia, continued Unresolved Business

Colombia has been under the ICC radar for 6 years now. Its domestic Criminal Code has a substantial regulation regarding international crimes. But, the country has been suffering an internal conflict for more than four decades; a conflict that appears unceasing, in which political corruption, drug-trafficking, paramilitaries and a high-level of violence are characteristic.

In 2006, the OTP declared it was “examining alleged crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court and investigations/proceedings conducted in Colombia against […] paramilitary leaders, politicians, guerrilla leaders and military personnel.” Later, the OTP added that it was also analyzing allegations of international networks supporting armed groups committing crimes in Colombia. But the Court has not formally commenced any investigation because of the complementarity assured by the Rome Statute.

After back and forth, meetings and exchange of information, the ICC concluded the Colombian judiciary was both willing and able to carry out its own investigation of the crimes. Therefore, the situation in the country is classified as a “situation under analysis.” In its December report on Preliminary Examinations, the OTP states that “There is no basis at this stage to conclude that the existing proceedings are not genuine”.

However, civil society organizations consider that the Colombian judiciary is not addressing past and present international crimes, including gender violence, correctly. Despite several visits by the OTP and other ICC officials, local NGOs continue to call for ICC action in Colombia, with as yet no official response from the Court.

Honduras, the Forgotten Coup

Honduras is party to the ICC and seven years after ratifying the Statute, President Zelaya was forcibly removed from his office by the military in 2009. The Head of Congress, Mr. Roberto Micheletti was appointed as provisional President, and served until Porfirio Lobo was elected President of Honduras later that year.

NGOs sent communications to the ICC on crimes against humanity being committed since September 2009. But in November 2010, the Argentine ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo announced publicly his decision to conduct a preliminary analysis of the situation. Even though his decision was welcomed, there has not been any update on the actions carried out by the Prosecutor’s office to date.

NGOs continued to call on several occasions for the protection of human rights defenders, journalists, and social activists. Human Rights Watch (HRW) has also shed light on police brutality, lack of accountability for human rights abuses committed in the context of the coup, and lack of judicial independence.

Before turning 10…

In spite of the above, we must not forget that the Rome Statute is the most important instrument presently available in the international criminal justice system to prevent mass atrocities and to bring justice to victims of heinous crimes. It is also the first institution to put forward high standards in terms of monitoring gender crimes, fairness of proceedings and victims’ rights.

The challenges of the ICC include the efforts to continue the ratification process of the Rome Statute in the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific, to work in the strengthening of national judiciary and to deliver rulings that will become a benchmark to judges worldwide. In this scenario, a more transparent policy regarding preliminary examination and criteria for the selection of cases would also be welcomed.

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Mariana Rodriguez-Pareja. Director of the Human Rights Program at Asuntos del Sur (ADS). Twitter handle: @maritaerrepe
Salvador Herencia Carrasco is the Legal Adviser to the Andean Commission of Jurists. E-mail: salvadorherencia@yahoo.com

El Salvador joins Guatemala and Nicaragua as the only Central American countries that are yet not States Parties to the International Criminal Court (ICC).  These three countries not only share their refusal to become party to the Rome Statute, but also share a common history: all three experienced non-international conflicts during the 70s, 80s and 90s, where several human rights and humanitarian law violations took place.  In each country there are currently different processes of redress underway for the atrocities committed during those conflicts.

In the following article I will only refer to the Salvadorian situation. In that sense, it is important to take into consideration the historical background of this country.  El Salvador suffered one of the most violent non-international conflicts in Latin America that left 75 thousand dead, and included enforced disappearances, extrajudicial executions, and outright massacres.Having those facts as background, one can see that the ICC has a special importance in a country like El Salvador.  In that sense, the preventive and dissuasive elements of the ICC would have a strong significance for El Salvador; not only because these elements will prevent such terrible crimes taking place again in El Salvador. But also in the case of more crimes occurring, and when the state is incapable or unwilling to prosecute the authors, there will be a fair and impartial tribunal that can judge the crimes.

Since the international adoption of the Rome Statute, El Salvador has rejected the Court’s principle of international jurisdiction.  An example of this is that El Salvador was one of the Latin American countries to sign a bilateral immunity agreement with the USA in order to prevent US nationals from being sent to the ICC, even when they have committed crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction.
In addition, during the ARENA (Alianza Republicana Nacionalista) Government (1989-2009) there was a clear opposition to the Rome Statute; ARENA claimed constitutional obstacles prevented it from ratifying.  However, the real concern of the right wing parties in El Salvador (ARENA and PCN, Partido de Conciliacion Nacional) was that the crimes committed during the Salvadorian internal armed conflict could be judged by the ICC.  Apparently these political institutions did not understand the principle of non-retroactive law (freedom from Ex Post Facto Laws) established in Article 11 of the Rome Statute.

In 2009, the Presidential Elections were won by the main left wing party (FMLN - Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional).  To many sectors of Salvadorian society, particularly the human rights movement, the new political scenario is seen as conducive to the ratification process.  Thus, the Ministry of International Affairs launched a public survey regarding the pros and cons of ratification.  However, results of this survey are still pending. On the other hand, in September 2011, the President of the National Congress, and member of the FMLN, urged the President of the Republic, Mauricio Funes, to send the Statute to the National Congress for ratification.  As yet, there has been no response from the President. It remains to be seen if and when El Salvador will ratify the treaty.

Original in Spanish at Asuntos del Sur: http://www.asuntosdelsur.org/opiniones/opinion/172

Revolutions have been sweeping the Middle East and North Africa for a year now, in what has been commonly referred to as the Arab Spring. When looking back and examining which Arab countries have not yet experienced large-scale protests or anything commonly considered a revolution, one realizes that these countries govern through traditional versus legal forms of domination, i.e., they are hereditary monarchies. The Kingdoms of Morocco, Jordan, Bahrain, as well as those of Oman, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the U.A.E. and Qatar, have been left relatively unscathed by the regional revolutionary zeitgeist, which begs the question, why? This piece will not attempt to prove if a monarchy as a form of government is more or less prone to popular revolt, or resilient to calls for reform. It will instead explain certain dynamics of such regimes as compared to their republican counterparts, which have already seen large-scale protests or democratic transition. I find that there are structural differences between the two forms of government, but ultimately there might not be such drastic differences in the prospects of change between the two.

Sources of Change

Arab monarchies have not been characterized by the persistent mass mobilization of their populations, but rather, by appeasement policies and repeated promises of reform. In the past year Saudi Arabia has allowed its women to vote (though not yet to drive); cabinets have been continuously reshuffled, constitutional amendments passed, reviews of government performance published, and economic incentives promised. There has been the constant reminder that the government is willing to engage in ‘open dialogue’ and the King of Jordan has even stated that the “failure to change is a lose-lose proposition”. But what kind of change can really emerge from within the regime itself? The government may promise reform, but essentially, the source of the ‘change’ would remain the monarch.

Initial promises of reform in Arab republics were not enough to diminish escalating protests, and ultimately, leaders were forced to resign. Libya was, and Syria remains, an exception. It was citizens of Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya who were the source of change, and who still continue to work toward achieving democracy. Yet even these bottom-up processes toward reform have faced difficulties, especially as competing opinions arise on how to form new governments and manage the democratic transition. Might it be more effective, then, to instate reform in a top-down fashion, as these monarchies claim to be doing?

Leaderless Revolutions versus Top-down Reform

The revolutions which have so far advanced the furthest are those of Tunisia and Egypt. No doubt they were bottom-up processes, with the social advantage of allowing for the participation of a vast array of society; the poor and the well-educated, Muslims and Christians, men and women. A leaderless revolution has its virtue in mass inclusion, bringing it one step closer toward democracy through mass mobilization. But beyond the point of removing the leader is when the leaderless revolution perhaps presents some difficulties, if not disadvantages.

The issue to be taken with mass inclusion is that during times of disagreement on how to put in place a new government, the remaining reform elements are often established upon what the country had already agreed upon, namely, the old regime’s legal system. This is perhaps exemplified by Egypt’s constitutional referendum, where, given the choice of rewriting the constitution or amending certain parts of it, about seventy percent of voters chose the latter, indicating their reversion to the old legal system, and reflecting a prevalent fear of too drastic change. Essentially, even the mass movements of the Arab republics have not yet been complete removals of the old regimes. Thus, when examining monarchies, is it any different when a king attempts to institute certain changes while maintaining the present governing structure?

Forms of Government Structure and Legitimation

Protests in Arab monarchies have on the whole called for government reform rather than the toppling of the leader. Essentially, this difference comes from the different forms of authority that the people attach to their leaders. As described by sociologist Max Weber, the traditional form of legitimate domination results from a leader’s claim to divine or hereditary privilege. The legitimacy of certain Arab kings in the eyes of their subjects rests on their claims of descent from the Prophet Mohamed. Conversely, legal forms, most commonly associated with democracies and republics, are based on legally rational measures, such as elections. If citizens have placed the leader in power though their consent, the removal of their consent therefore rationalizes his removal.

Perhaps it is then more difficult to imagine the monarch’s cross-generational familial ties with the throne severed in just a few months. Perhaps not. Lisa Anderson indicates in her 1991 article, Absolutism and the Resilience of Monarchy in the Middle East, that “monarchy as currently understood in the Middle East is no more indigenous than liberal democracy”. The families of the current leaders- King Mohammed VI of Morocco and King Abdullah II of Jordan- were actually instated by French and British colonial rule in the 20th century. Left with remnants of colonial structures, these monarchies have been able to remain strong and centralized. The removal of presidents like Mubarak and Ben Ali, and not any Arab kings as of yet, essentially comes down to what it means to cause the downfall of the regime, and not merely the head of state. In Egypt, the army, a strong U.S. ally, still holds power after Mubarak’s fall and maintains certain stabilizing policies of the Mubarak era. But when a monarch is toppled, essentially, the state’s legislative, military, and sometimes even religious allegiances shift, allowing for a greater chance of state decentralization and regional uncertainty. Perhaps fear of this uncertainty is what had deterred the call for the monarch’s removal, until now.

The People Demand the Downfall of the…. King?

Throughout the revolutions, people have expressed their will by chanting, “The people demand the downfall of the regime”. Despite the more drastic outcomes that might result from the removal of a monarch as opposed to a president, citizens of kingdoms have begun expressing the same ambitions. Following sustained protests since February, it was only recently that protestors in Bahrain began calling for the removal of the king himself. This call and response to the king’s speech given last week was voiced by the head of the Bahrain Center for Human Rights, who claimed that it was actually the king whom the people faulted and that that it was since his ascendancy to the throne in 2002 that injustice has been rampant.

In Morocco, the desire for the removal of the king has also been displayed during street protests. According to the NYTimes, the country’s motto “God, the Nation, the King,” has been transformed into “God, the Nation, Liberty”; and “Long live the King” has become “Long Live the People.” Morocco, unlike Jordan and Bahrain, was officially an absolutist monarchy. The king’s first step toward reform was announcing a transition to a constitutional monarchy, yet still allotting himself supreme military and religious authority. But top-down reform measures are not effectively appeasing the people. Just today, AlJazeera has reported the self-immolation of unemployed college graduates, echoing the catalytic action of Mohamed Bouazizi at the start of the Arab Spring. Protestors in kingdoms are slowly starting to adopt methods resembling those of their counterparts in republics. Whether these mass movements will be effective in countries with a heavily centralized king, or whether monarchies will prove themselves immune to change by the people, is to be discovered as the movements develop.

Please send any observations or interesting articles to my attention at Nadine@skylightpictures.com or to our Facebook page.

History of Political Discontent

Within the context of political upheavals in Egypt, Tunisia, Syria, Yemen, and Libya, the revolution in Bahrain is certainly not an isolated event. Dissatisfaction with the ruling family has been cyclical, and over the years there have been small steps taken toward political reform. But amidst the regional effort for overthrowing authoritarian regimes, the current uprising for reform in Bahrain has persisted since February, ultimately becoming a call for regime change, in the hope that the country will embark on its own democratic transition. The current regime in Bahrain, officially known as the Kingdom of Bahrain, is a monarchy led by the Khalifa family. The chief of state is King Hamad, and while he’s only held his position since February 14, 2002 (only, comparative to the decades-long rule of leaders from neighboring Arab states), the prime minister, also the King’s uncle, has been in power since the country’s independence from Britain in 1971. The revolution has been portrayed as simply an uprising of the country’s Shia majority (who constitute 70% of the population) against the Sunni ruling family, but with a prime minister who’s been in power for 30 years, surely the issues at hand are not only sectarian but of national representation and reform.

Since February 14, 2011, there have been injustices committed against Bahraini citizens advocating for their right to self- expression and for government reform.  Peaceful assemblies of protest have been met with violence. Laws have been passed so that even marching in a protest can warrant an arrest for illegal assembly. Military trials have been called for 47 doctors and nurses accused by the Bahraini government of stockpiling weapons, stealing medicine, and inflicting harm on their patients. In their humanitarian efforts to treat protest casualties , they have been accused of trying to subvert the regime. The trials of the convicted medical personnel were resumed earlier this month, for which foreign coverage was restricted. 

According to Nabeel Rajab, a prominent Bahraini human rights activist, in 2004 the government shut down the Bahrain Center for Human Rights after its director accused the prime minister of responsibility for the country’s systemic corruption. The director was subsequently, and still remains, imprisoned. The current liberation movement has been a collective effort comprising sectarian, political, economic, cultural, and social discontent. Nabeel Rajab has also claimed in an interview with Jadiliyya that “some of them are Communists, others are Shia and Sunni, intellectuals and uneducated, managers and workers. This is the first time that we are able to bring together so many people of such diverse backgrounds and cultures in one movement, one cause, and one uprising”. The 1990s uprisings had ended with the declaration of a National Action Charter, meant to place the country under constitutional rule and toward reform. This led to the first parliamentary elections in 2002 and saw a period of economic advancement, but clearly, this has not been sufficient to address the grievances of those still protesting even after the destruction of one of the physical symbol of the protests – Pearl Roundabout.

The GCC, Media and International Double Standards

The struggles against the authoritarian regimes of Egypt and Tunisia were largely played out internally, between pro-government and opposition groups of the same nationality. In Libya, the case was different, with NATO’s involvement in toppling Qaddafi, and in Syria, where observers from the Arab League have been sent to monitor government abuse. In Bahrain, however, neighboring countries and even Western powers have shown an interest in maintaining the current regime. As a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Bahrain’s stability is integral to the economic and political well-being of the organization’s member countries which include other monarchies such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE. Therefore, these countries have taken action, whether direct or indirect, invited or uninvited, to maintain the current status quo in Bahrain. On March 14, Saudi Arabia sent in troops to suppress the revolutionaries. Regional media outlets, while continuing to focus on developments in Yemen and Syria, have largely remained silent on any such developments in Bahrain. Surely this is not only because Bahrain is a relatively small country, but because of the location of AlJazeera and AlArabiya, the most prominent regional media sources, in GCC countries.

The revolutions seem to have taken the U.S. by surprise, and policies toward different Arab countries have oftentimes been contradictory. According to Human Rights First, “Multiple factors ranging from the influence of the U.S. and Saudi Arabian governments to the lack of access allowed to foreign journalists in the country can be blamed” for the limited media coverage that Bahrain has received, as compared to Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Syria and Yemen. In spite of the injustices that the Bahraini government commits against its own citizens, foreign relations with Bahraini leaders have maintained the status quo. Despite criticizing Russian and Chinese opposition to intervention in Syria, the U.S. itself continues to sell arms to the government of Bahrain, arms that are being used against Bahraini citizens. At the same time, the U.S. has sent a former police chief to “train” the Bahraini police force on crowd control tactics through the use of “non-lethal” methods such as tear gas. Of course, as evidenced by tear-gas supplied to Egypt, we know that these methods can indeed be lethal and are tools of state-sponsored human rights abuses. Bahraini citizens, initially calling for reform, are now realizing the extent of the state-sponsored corruption which goes so far as to humiliate Bahraini citizens at the hands of foreign personnel.

State of Emergency and Foreign “Conspiracy”

The pattern of government oppression in the region has become all too familiar: citizens hold non-violent assemblies, police are unable to impose crowd control, a national state of emergency is declared, violence ensues. The claim by some governments that the revolutionary movements were “foreign conspiracies” has also been predictable; in Bahrain, there have thus far been claims by the government (attributed to the Shia-Sunni divide) of Iranian involvement in the revolution. It is clear that there has been foreign interest, however, in favor of maintaining the authoritarian government. Without the backing of the Gulf Cooperation Council, it seems Bahrain’s government would have a difficult time maintaining its oppressive and increasingly abusive control over its people. As of March, a “state of emergency” had been declared, and was backed by GCC capitals, especially Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. This law prohibits even peaceful public assemblies and permits the military to suppress them. In March, the GCC pledged $20 billion in financial aid to Bahrain and Oman over a 10-year period to assist the two nations in their struggle with Arab protests. In June, in an effort to salvage Bahrain’s image and economy, King Hamad lifted the state of emergency, offered to renew talks with opposition leaders, and formed an independent commission of experts known as the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) to investigate abuses during the February and March protests. But this talk of reform accompanied by contradictory state actions has only led protestors to escalate their demand for regime change.

Abuse Persists, Now with more Observers

Most recently, Nabeel Rajab has been beaten by state-hired personnel, some of whom he claims were Jordanian and Pakistani. The government, on the other hand, has stated that it had found the activist lying on the floor and that it took him to the nearest hospital. A representative of the Gulf Council for Foreign Relations claims that Bahrain is different from Egypt and Tunisia, because the situation is “a reform process, not a revolution”. But abuse and shameless lying cannot be steps toward reform. In the face of continued oppression, it becomes clear that the removal of a regime that tortures its citizens and lies to protect its image is perhaps the only means to bring about real change. But in a country facing not only internal oppression but also regional pressures to maintain the status quo and with the U.S. continuing to sell arms to Bahrain, how loud will the collective voice of Bahrain’s one million citizens have to shout? At least now there is hope in that the world is slowly awakening to the abuse in Bahrain, and civil society organizations have been keeping track of abuses which had largely been hidden since the start of the 2011 revolutionary movements.

So far this blog series has investigated the US-ICC relationship from a historical perspective.  It has become evident that this relationship has waxed and waned from one of initial engagement, but not acceptance, under the Clinton administration, to belligerency under the first several years of the Bush administration, to a more engaging, almost accepting approach under the latter years of Bush and the early years of the Obama administration.  With these previous historical perspectives as our foundation, we may now ask what policy towards the ICC is most beneficial for the United States.  In other words, what approach to the Court serves the United States’ national interests?  In order to engage this question, it is imperative that we first understand the concept of ‘national interest’ before discussing how US-ICC relations affect it.

Oftentimes the literature and debate on US national interest is characterized as contentious and partisan.  I would argue that the contestation concerning national interest is typically not about what constitutes national interest, but the means by which the United States achieves that interest. Generally speaking, there is a commonality that persists in the debate over national interest; and although some (like Ron Paul’s neo-isolationist agenda) remain opposed to this common notion of national interest, others are united around the idea of perpetuating a global liberal order.  The pursuit of what John G. Ikenberry referred to as a “liberal grand strategy” binds together the seemingly different foreign policy agendas of such administrations as Woodrow Wilson, Harry Truman, John Kennedy, Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush and Barack Obama.  What they all have in common is the desire to have American liberal values permeate all areas of the global community.  Such values would include: rational leadership, limited and representative government, freedom and liberty of the individual, and substantive equality among these individuals.  Where they differ, as mentioned above, is in the means by which the US achieves this goal.  Should the United States pursue a liberal institutionalist or multilateral policy, a unilateral approach, interventionist policy, or something altogether different?  But in the end, all administrations are trying to perpetuate the global liberal order because it is within this liberal order that the United States remains hegemonic.

So how does US policy concerning the ICC fit into this national interest debate?  In order to address this question, we must first address whether the ICC is a liberal institution.  If US national interest is bound up in the promotion of a global liberal order, then acceptance of international institutions should in some way be predicated on their relationship to liberal principles.  And one only need read the Rome Statute to realize that the ICC is clearly a liberal institution.  This institution accepts the notion of individual equality, protection and equality before the law, election of authority via democratic means, victims’ rights, rights of the accused, and many other legal-liberal principles.  Aside from the use of bench trials as opposed to trial by a jury of peers, the Rome Statute is complementary to the United States Bill of Rights.  Thus, the liberal nature of the Court is simply unquestionable.  This does not eliminate the issues raised by the United States concerning the Court, as discussed in earlier entries in this series, but it stipulates that the ICC retains many of the liberal principles that are inherent in a liberal global order.

How then should this affect US policy concerning the ICC?  This brings us to the final piece of the puzzle, the notion of hegemony.  As I stated earlier, the liberal order is a fundamental part of US hegemony; but what exactly does this mean?  Hegemony is defined as the ability to control outcomes.  Traditionally, this is discussed in a purely material way—which country has the largest military, most advanced technology, strongest economy, etc.  This form of hegemony, not only in its acquisition but also in a state’s ability to sustain this position, is predicated on a more coercive form of authority.  However, another way to conceive of hegemonic authority is via ideational power.  Some, such as Joseph Nye, discuss this as soft power, or power via consent and acceptance as opposed to domination and control.  The Italian philosopher Antonio Gramsci described this form of authority as “intellectual and moral leadership.”  But no matter what we term this form of hegemony, it remains predicated on an intersubjectively accepted understanding of norms and principles that finds its leadership in a hegemonic nation-state working to perpetuate this system.  Thus, its causal source of power is in aligning one’s interests with those of the global community, not in imposing your will on said community in a coercive manner.

If the United States is the current hegemon, and I believe this is empirically accurate, and the causal source of power is the acceptance of a global liberal order, then how should the US approach the ICC?  Bearing in mind the foundational conception of both ideational hegemony and the liberal nature of the ICC, it seems accurate to claim that an oppositional policy towards the ICC is both hindering the international community’s pursuit of global justice and undermining the current status of American hegemony.  This is due to the liberal nature of the ICC and its contribution to the perpetuation of the global liberal order.  As a result, the United States’ ability to pursue its national interest is also being hindered.  One must recall that the basis of American hegemony throughout much of its history has been the pursuit of an international system that reflects its domestic liberal values.  This pursuit exists in both material power and ideational hegemony, or one predicated on soft power.  Thus, US opposition to the ICC and its mandate appears detrimental to the primary goal of American national interest—the perpetuation of a global liberal order.  The only rational policy recommendation is acceptance of the ICC and its pursuit of global justice.  Any other approach to the Court undermines US power as opposed to sustaining it. 

In making this recommendation, it is important to recognize that such a policy originates from a power-based perspective, not a moral one.  Many of the world’s most pre-eminent legal scholars have drafted supportive documents in favor of US support and/or ratification of the Rome Statute based on morality.  As evidenced by the slow and incremental engagement of the ICC by the United States, it is apparent that this line of rational thinking has not fully permeated the mindset of current policymakers.  Thus, this editorial attempts to speak to government officials in a language they can understand—power.  By opposing the ICC, the United States is failing to support its own liberal agenda.  The result of such action is a loss of ideational influence, a decline in hegemonic status, and a defeat for American national interests—in short, a loss of power.  In order to rectify this situation, the US need not openly embrace the ICC and immediately move towards ratification of the Rome Statute; instead, the US should continue to establish a working relationship with the Court and cease its undermining tactics.  The Obama administration has done well to create such an affable relationship with the Court and needs to continue with this approach.  Only such a policy will serve as a foundation for future participation in liberal institution building and as a result, continued promotion of a liberal world order—both of which serve US national interests.

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Read parts One and Two of the special series on the US and the ICC here.

One year has passed since the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, a Tunisian fruit vendor whose actions ignited a chain of protests against social inequity in the Middle East, and almost as long since the January 25th Revolution in Egypt. The Arab Spring was remarkable in its ability to mobilize citizens through the use of non-violent methods and sometimes, even, through humorous slogans and posters. Yet while some government bodies initially responded to non-violence in the like (i.e. the Tunisian and Egyptian armies), others in Syria and Libya have since the start provoked the use of violence and undermined the main goals of the movement for social justice, better living conditions, and freedom, causing civilians to take up arms against the state.  Last year’s advancement in the democratic aspirations of citizens across the Middle East and North Africa was phenomenal, yet with immediate living conditions becoming dire, a reconsideration of the virtues of the revolution comes as no surprise and leaves it difficult to legitimately claim that the revolution has been wholly beneficial. But sometimes conditions will become worse in order to get better. Overcoming the corruption and civil injustice of previous decades will require consistent efforts toward the rejuvenation of civil society and government.

The issues to be tackled over the coming months are varied and heavy. While I do not claim full understanding of any issue at hand, I’ve outlined my hopes for 2012, using mostly examples from Egypt. The ideas expressed are based on my understanding of the issues through first hand experience and from surveying both U.S. and Middle Eastern reports.

1) Education
Education reform is essential for the emergence of a generation of students receiving a decent public education and college degrees allowing them to attain a career in their field. This problem is not specific to Egypt, but when so many people behind the wheel of a taxi actually have degrees that can place them in engineering and public health positions, the education and economic systems are lamentable. An increase in teacher wages is probably key to eliminating the widespread need for private tutoring outside of the classroom, which has undermined the integrity of public education. What I don’t think is immediately necessary is the alteration of textbook narratives honoring Hosni Mubarak for his service in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, among other things. Physical evidence of his negation were evident as of March, when none of his previously omnipresent portraits were visible as I roamed Alexandria’s streets. The removal of his portraits, his name from schools and subway stations cannot change history, but positive measures toward changing an education system that aimed to foster blind obedience to the state can help correct the thirty years of Mubarak’s rule which saw Egypt suffer.

2) Moral Reform
With the relatively moderate Muslim Brotherhood and the more conservative Salafi Party soon to hold a majority of legislative power, the external image of Egyptian society might change. If they choose, unwisely, to focus on minute aspects of social reform rather than on larger ones such as the economy, laws might advocate the compulsory veiling of Muslim women or banning certain aspects common to tourism such as alcohol. Who knows? What I hope is that if measures such as these are indeed to be imposed, that steps to remove corrupt practices of the state first be achieved, so that religious reform will logically follow moral reform. Corruption is not compatible with religious ideals of virtue and honesty, and state policies should not encourage citizens to take on religion in a ritualistic sense while opting for daily forms of bribery, political favors, and police brutality in the name of state service or even survival. The degradation faced by citizens at the hands of police brutality continues to be unjustifiable, and the restoration of dignity through moral reform is a priority. For more, please read Alaa al-Aswany’s segments on Social Justice and State Repression in On the State of Egypt and Galal Amin’s Egypt in the Era of Hosni Mubarak.

3) Civil Society and NGOs
In the face of the ever-extended state of emergency law that legalizes censorship, restricts basic freedoms, and allows police forces to detain any citizen suspected of dangerous behavior, the presence of human rights organizations and observers is important to record, if not prevent, violations. Of course the Egyptian Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) knows this and has been cracking down on those organizations which it feels are funded by foreign powers and present a potential threat . Yet it is essential for these organizations to persist in their struggles in order to help meet the demands of the revolution, and to form strong civil society networks to hold their governments accountable and to establish a strong justice system. The actions of the SCAF to cover up the public exposure of certain violations such as the continued use of tear gas and beatings to disperse protests, by cracking down on human rights organizations, is regrettable. This leads me onto the next topics:

4) Military
The military forces of the Arab countries facing revolution have been pivotal determinants of the country’s ensuing circumstances in their choice of siding with either the leader or the people. The Egyptian military was deemed heroic in its refusal to apply armed force against protesters during the initial days of protest, while Mubarak still reigned. Proof of this sentiment was evident on the streets in Egypt as of March, with slogans painted along the Alexandrian shore claiming, “The army and the people are one hand” and “The army and the people are in Egypt’s service”. Yet this civilian-military unity was subsequently proven false, as the SCAF’s eventual resort to violence against civilians has shown. Is it possible to regain their reputation as heroes? We have yet to see the SCAF reform abusive practices and government policies. My hope for the militaries of the region is that they will not massacre their own people for the short-term goal of keeping the current leaders in power. Their rule shall eventually end, whether by means of internal or foreign influence, but an abusive human rights record will live to tell of these atrocities.

5) Internal Justice and International Organizations
The leaders of Tunisia, Yemen, and Libya have sealed their fate either by finding deals of impunity or facing death. It is Mubarak’s pending trial that is expected to set up a system of accountability. I hope that his trial, and those of his sons and his minister of interior is not merely a symbolic gesture; this needs to set a precedent against the impunity of top-ranking officials and businessmen which had previously pervaded Egyptian trials. Future leaders should remember this trial, should they ever step out of line. Mubarak and his sons should not be executed for justice to prevail, but the trial should set a precedent for the rule of law to establish an effective internal system of justice. In the case of internal justice fallbacks, it would be wise for Arab governments to consider the jurisdiction of international bodies such as the ICC. Delegations from Arab states, particularly Egypt, Kuwait, Jordan, and Syria that participated in the Rome Conference and the Preparatory Commission meetings in 1998, were actively involved in the establishment of the International Criminal Court.  I wish for effective measures to be taken against the systems of impunity present in the region, whether or not this involves the actions of international organizations. The ICC has procedures in place for applying the rule of law to account for the actions of authoritarian leaders, but it can only do so much on its own. There is a need to work with cooperative representatives, and this goes back to my third point on civil society building.

2011 was a year to realize the power of non-violent movements, the strength in thousands of bodies gathered together in a single square, with a single goal. The power of the collective will. 2012 will be a year to explore new methods of government accountability, experiment with new forms of self-expression and push toward new frontiers in justice and civil liberty. Maybe my aspirations have been inspired by viewing the overly-optimistic advertisements on Egyptian television depicting a sun gleaming over smiling citizens proudly waving their flags. Or maybe it’s this positivity that is needed to continue this revolutionary drive, past the toppling of authoritarian leaders, one year since the beginning of the revolution. Of that, at least, I’m certain.

With the sentencing this week of two former Rwandan politicians for their role in Rwanda’s 1994 genocide, the Tanzania-based International Criminal Tribunal continues its work of trying the masterminds of the violence.  In its 17-year history, the tribunal has achieved a number of firsts. 

Mathieu Ngirumpatse and Edouard Karemera, president and vice-president of Rwanda’s then-ruling party, will be spending the rest of their lives behind bars for turning a blind eye to the atrocities committed by their party’s youth wing, the Interahamwe.

They join some 21 others currently serving sentences following trials in which they were found guilty of such charges as genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.

Seventeen years ago, the United Nations set up the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to catch the so-called “big fish,” or high-level organizers, of a methodical, systematic campaign aimed at wiping out the Tutsi ethnic group.  An estimated 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus were killed during several months in 1994.

Since its beginning, the tribunal has indicted 92 suspects and has passed down judgments against 72 people.  These include former government ministers, army commanders, diplomats, journalists, and other Rwandan elite.

Tribunal spokesman, Roland Amoussouga, says the capture and trials of the genocide’s architects have brought about what he calls a “credible and on-going process of national reconciliation and healing” in Rwanda.

“If they were not arrested, God forbid, nobody knows what could have happened to the peace and stability in Rwanda.  At the beginning, when they were not all arrested, there was trouble in most parts of Rwanda,” he said.

Amoussouga says the tribunal’s efforts have complemented Rwanda’s justice system.

In Rwanda, one of the most prominent justice activities has been the setting up of traditional `gacaca’ courts to conduct trials of people accused of committing murder, rape, looting, and other crimes during the genocide.  An estimated 1.5 million cases have been heard since 2001, mostly at the village level.

The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda has achieved a number of firsts.  It was the first international court to convict someone of genocide.

On June 24 of this year, the former Minister of Family and Women’s Development, Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, was sentenced to life in prison.  Amoussouga says her conviction sets her apart.

“She was indicted for rape as (a) crime of genocide and she was the first woman to be arrested for genocide, for crimes against humanity.  All these made her unique,” Amoussouga said.

She was tried alongside her son, who is also now behind bars for life.

Amoussouga says the tribunal has built up, in his words, a “substantial body of jurisprudence” on such concepts as “genocide,” “crimes against humanity,” and “war crimes” that can be used in courtrooms in other jurisdictions.  He says the tribunal has also built up an extensive databank of historical evidence of the Rwandan genocide.

But the tribunal has had its share of challenges and criticisms.

Carina Tertsakian is senior researcher at Human Rights Watch in London.  She says that the process has been, in her words, “slow and cumbersome,” too bureaucratic, and punctured with many delays.

But, says Tertsakian, the most serious shortcoming is an omission to confront atrocities committed by a rebel group at the time that forms Rwanda’s current government.

“One aspect in which it (the tribunal) has failed is to prosecute cases of crimes committed by the Rwanda Patriotic Front, the ruling power currently in power in Rwanda.  The Rwandan government has put very, very heavy pressure on the various ICTR prosecutors over the years to drop investigations into RPF crimes, and one by one, sadly, they have succumbed to that,” Tertsakian said.

At the end of 2008, Human Rights Watch sent the tribunal’s prosecutor, Justice Hassan B. Jallow, a letter urging the court to investigate reports of revenge killings of thousands of civilians by the Rwandan Patriotic Front.

The tribunal is set to wind up its work in 2014.

Read original article on VOA here.http://www.voanews.com/english/news/africa/Rwanda-Criminal-Tribunal-Pleased-With-Progress-136146908.html

This past year has been highlighted by drastic political changes across the Arab world and has seen developments in the engagement and prospects of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the Middle East and North Africa region. Shortly after its toppling of former authoritarian president, Ben Ali, Tunisia acceded to the Rome Statute, making it a state party to the ICC. Libya is not a state party to the ICC, however, after being referred to the Court by the U.N. Security Council, Libya is now one of the ICC’s seven situation countries. So far, the Office of the Prosecutor has requested arrest warrants for Colonel Qaddafi (prior to his death), Qaddafi’s son, Saif al-Islam, as well as the former head of Military Intelligence, Abdullah Al-Senussi. They have been charged with crimes against humanity. While the ICC has been quick to act on certain cases of human rights abuses in the MENA, it has stalled on other issues.

One main issue facing not just the ICC but other international organizations, especially in the past few months, concerns reaching a consensus on Palestinian statehood. After the 2008-2009 humanitarian crisis in Gaza, the Palestinian National Authority filed a declaration at the International Criminal Court (ICC) accepting the ICC’s jurisdiction in the territory of Palestine. Three years later, no clear response has been made on whether Palestine meets the statutory requirements for the ICC to accept jurisdiction there. But the decision for denominating Palestine as a state does not just entail the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination, or a nationalistic struggle for the reclamation of rights to land after more than sixty years. Rather, it entails establishing a system by which to hold the Israeli government accountable for certain crimes it has committed against the Palestinian people on Palestinian territory, as well as holding Hamas accountable for crimes it has committed against Israelis.

Pending: Palestinian Statehood: What can the ICC do for Palestine?

On January 22, 2009, the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the International Criminal Court received an official communication from the Minister of Justice of the Palestinian Authority (PA), Ali Kashan. He placed a declaration with the Registrar under Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute, which allows States not party to the Statute to accept the Court’s jurisdiction. While the PA’s declaration made no mention of the war in Gaza, which took place between December 2008, and January 2009, the request for ICC jurisdiction immediately followed it. On May 3, 2010, the OTP published a “Summary of Submissions on whether the declaration lodged by the Palestinian National Authority meets statutory requirements”. This was a compilation of different opinions regarding the issue, both for and against jurisdiction. One such opinion comes from John Quigley, who states, “If Palestine is not a state, then there is no state that has the capacity to grant the ICC jurisdiction in Gaza. Gaza would be a virtual dead zone from the perspective of the ICC. The only remaining potential bases of jurisdiction would be the nationality of a particular offender, or a referral by the UN Security Council.” The OTP has yet to make its own decision on the issue. This evaluation by the Office would also determine whether crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction have been committed and whether there are national proceedings in relation to the alleged crimes.

In a recent lecture held in New York, Richard Falk, Professor of International Law at Princeton University, also having served as United Nations Human Rights Inquiry Commissioner for the Palestinian territories and as the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Palestinian human rights, spoke of Israeli impunity in regards to international law and the consequences it would face were Palestine to be recognized as a state. The mission for Palestinian statehood is inconvenient for Israel not because it is a unilateral action and, as it states, a digression from negotiations and the “peace process,” but because every step closer to Palestinian statehood is a step closer to holding the Israeli government accountable for crimes committed against the Palestinian people, such as the 2008-2009 incident in Gaza. The main peace settlements that have been put in place in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict have been interim agreements largely characterized by the postponement of any substantive steps toward a Palestinian state and which allow for Israel to respond with alterations of the geographic boundaries, such as creating settlements in East Jerusalem and the West Bank.

With Israeli ratification of the Rome Statute out of the question, as such action would only cause the Israeli government to hold itself accountable for its own actions, it is Palestinian ratification that would hold the Israeli government responsible for crimes against humanity committed against the Palestinian people since the establishment of the court in July 1, 2002. However, in order to investigate crimes committed in Palestinian territories, the ICC must first determine whether it holds state status. As seen in other international organizations, the debate over the recognition of a Palestinian state in Gaza and the West Bank is splitting countries based on their geopolitical interests. The U.S., backing Israel, vetoed the vote at the Security Council. Israel’s impunity with regards to international law, which Professor Falk spoke of, would be altered with the recognition of a Palestinian state, as only states can give consent to ICC jurisdiction over acts committed in their territory, and Palestine, once having ratified the Rome statute as a state, would be able to file a complaint for certain cases of humanitarian violations that Israel has committed on Palestinian soil.

The Prisoner Swap and Moving Forward

Israel and the Palestinian Authority have recently completed a prisoner swap of 1027 Palestinian prisoners for the Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, held captive by Hamas in Gaza since 2006. According to Human Rights Watch, Israel linked its aerial bombing of Gaza’s sole electricity power station on June 28, 2006, to Shalit’s capture two days earlier and later prevented full repairs to the station. Due to the blockade, the power station’s reduced capacity caused citizens of Gaza to experience an average of eight hours of blackouts each day. Joe Stork, deputy Middle East director at Human Rights Watch, states that “Gaza’s civilians should no longer suffer under Israel’s punitive blockade, and Hamas should end abuses of detainees, whether Israeli or Palestinian.” At the same time, along with fostering mutual respect for human rights, punitive measures put in place would hold perpetrators on both sides accountable and allow for a more effective system of justice.

This past year in the Arab world has seen a striking series of civilian uprising against authoritarian governments. These regional changes have opened up several opportunities for justice seeking and for democratic transition. As the revolutions continue to unfold in Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen and Bahrain, it is important not to neglect citizens of regions such as Iraq and Palestine, facing humanitarian crises not just at the hands of their heads of states, but also at the hands of foreign powers. According to the Coalition for the ICC, Palestinian NGOs meeting last year decided that the OTP has compiled sufficient information and arguments and thus should move to the decision phase, in accordance with Article 15(3), to request for authorization of an investigation. With the drastically changing power dynamics in the region, we can only expect for there to be transformations in how citizens of the region respond to international law mechanisms and hope that this is reciprocated in how international institutions respond to them.

Please send any observations or interesting articles to my attention at Nadine@skylightpictures.com or to our Facebook page at https://www.facebook.com/#!/TheReckoningArabic.

By Mariana Rodriguez-Pareja


In June 2011 – only a few months after a brutal crackdown on mass protests – King Hamad Bin Isa Al Khalifa of Bahrain announced the establishment of an independent panel of legal experts “to investigate and report on the events that occurred in Bahrain in February and March 2011” and the subsequent consequences arising out of those events. The international community welcomed the positive development, inconceivable only a few months ago. The Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) was established and was met with both hope and skepticism.
On November 23rd, after four months of investigations, the BICI made public their report and their findings.

The Panel

The five-member inquiry panel was comprised of individuals of internationally recognized independence, impartiality, integrity and expertise. These individuals included: Professor Cherif Bassiouni, recent Chair of the UN Human Rights Council and member of the UN panel investigating the situation in Libya; Justice Philippe Kirsch, former President of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and member of the UN panel investigating the situation in Libya; Sir Nigel Rodley, current member of the UN Human Rights Committee and former UN Special Rapporteur on Torture; Dr Mahnoush Arsanjani, former UN legal advisor; and Dr Badria al ‘Awadhi, expert on international and Sharia law.
Interestingly, Dr. Philippe Kirsch and Professor Cherif Bassiouni have experience with the International Criminal Court. Dr. Kirsch is the former President of the ICC and was the Chair of the Diplomatic Conference on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court in 1998 – also known as the Rome Conference. Professor Bassiouni was the Head of the Drafting Committee of the Rome Statute at the Rome Conference and one of the most renowned academics on international criminal law.

Mixed Reactions and Skepticism

In New York, United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon welcomed the decision to launch a probe to investigate the incidents. His spokesperson issued a statement on Ban Ki-Moon’s behalf in which he “welcome(d) this development and underscore(d) that the commission should be granted full access to all individuals, organizations and information relevant to the investigation.”  Moreover, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay welcomed the move and said she was confident it would meet international standards and noted that her team would examine the details of this “major development.”
Bahrainis remained skeptical, however, as to the reasons the King would establish such a Commission.  Some viewed the BICI as an attempt to whitewash the human rights violations committed by the Bahraini Government, even questioning and attacking the integrity of its Commissioners.

Bad Record

Bahrain’s human rights record is quite controversial, and has been described by Human Rights Watch (HRW) as ‘dismal’. The government has closed or banned human rights organizations at various times, imposed travel bans on human rights activists, tried and sentenced civilians in military courts, and has jailed human rights defenders and activists (many of who have reportedly been tortured). Throughout the years, numerous governments and organizations have called on the Bahraini government to comply with its obligations under international treaties that it has joined. However, its human rights record has not improved.
In 2010, HRW cited reports of 430 missing and detained persons who remained unaccounted for by the government. The case of Ayat al-Qurmezi, a poet and student who was sentenced for reading aloud a poem at a pro-reform rally, made international headlines; she was reportedly tortured while in detention.
Furthermore, as part of the “Arab Spring,” Bahrainis peacefully protested at the Pearl Roundabout in Manama, mirroring Tahrir Square in Cairo. A brutal repression followed and since 14 February, approximately 50 people have died.  The Pearl Roundabout monument was destroyed in an attempt to completely eliminate any reminder of this part of Bahrain’s history. The Gulf Cooperation Council sent in troops at the request of the Bahraini government to restore peace and order. On 14 March, the King declared Martial Law.

Human Rights Violations

The 503 page report of the BICI is divided into 12 Chapters, in which they go through Bahrain’s history, relevant legal aspects of the country’s legal system, construct a narrative of the events that took place in February and March, 2011 and at the Salamiya Medical facility, and investigate human rights violations.  The Commission determined that it was not its task to determine “which side was responsible for what outcomes”, but that in order to understand the evolution of the events, they had to look at the facts and their “underlying causes”.  They concluded that what occurred in March/Feb and in its aftermath was a result of “an escalating process in which the government and the opposition have their share of responsibility in allowing events to unfold as they did.”
The Commission criticized the government for the lack of accountability and the culture of impunity throughout the security agencies of Bahrain. This was especially evident in the excessive use of force, particularly by the Ministry of the Interior, in dealing with what were for the most part peaceful demonstrations. Grave violations of human rights included the deprivation of life, torture, and arbitrary detention in addition to the demolition of mosques and the systematic expulsions and firings on of students and laborers.  It also documented attacks on migrant workers.
In the case of torture, the report found that “many detainees were subjected to torture and other forms of physical and psychological abuse while in custody”, indicating that this type of behavior was both systemic and systematic by certain government agencies. While there were no reports of torture after June 10, other forms of ill-treatment were still reported.
Victims indicated they were coerced to sign statements or confessions implicating themselves and others for criminal conduct. The most common techniques, according to the report were blindfolding, sleep-deprivation, exposure to extreme temperatures, verbal abuse and threats of rape. Unfortunately, the government took little if any steps to investigate the widespread allegations of torture.

Recommendations

The Panel made several recommendations to the King, including the need to adopt legislative measures requiring the Attorney General to investigate the claims of torture and other forms of cruel or inhumane treatment, plus training sessions to the judiciary and prosecutorial personnel to ensure their activities contribute to the prevention and eradication of torture.
But most importantly the report highlights the need for reconciliation in the country. The need to reach a point of better understanding and appreciation of human rights, including the respect for religious and ethnic diversities is crucial.  At this moment, there is no program in schools or with the mass media, reaching out to all Bahrainis, to try to reconcile both the Sunni population and the Shia minority.
Yet the culture of impunity for Bahrain security forces seems all but over.  The Commission was only meant to be a first step.  Where the government was quick to attack other findings on the events in Bahrain, the report was meant to confirm – by a Commission established by the King himself – the widespread violations of human rights throughout the country.
That part is now done.
The second part would be to seriously take into account the recommendation of the Commission to establish an independent and impartial national commission to follow up and implement the recommendations of the report.
That part has not been done and will only leave Bahrain with two options, to continue on a path to reconciliation and justice, or allow a return to the status quo of impunity for human rights abuse.
The imposed selection of the members of the committee, without allowing those entities to choose for themselves, as well as in the lack of accountability for the human rights violations almost a full year after the beginning of the protests, raises concerns over which path Bahrain is following.
Protesters have taken back to the streets and the numbers are growing.  How far is the government willing to push its population?

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Mariana Rodriguez-Pareja is a Communications expert and a human rights advocate with a special interest in international justice. Twitter handle: @maritaerrepe.

NEW YORK, Dec 20 (Reuters) - The five countries that contribute the most funding to the International Criminal Court are seeking to cap the court’s budget for the third year in a row, according to diplomats involved in the negotiations.

The budget negotiations are taking place in New York this week as part of the annual meeting of the Hague-based court’s 120 member countries.

Japan, Germany, Britain, France and Italy, which together contribute more than half the court’s funding, have pushed for zero growth in the court’s budget because of the global financial crisis, said the diplomats, who declined to talk on the record.

The five states are trying to ensure that the “budgetary constraints of all member states are well reflected in the ICC budget,” said a French diplomat.

The International Criminal Court, which investigates war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, had a budget of 103 million euros ($134 million) for 2011, 20 million euros ($26 million) short of what it says it needs for 2012.

The court has not received a budget increase for two years. In 2009, its budget allocated funding for 218 prosecution staff, responsible for investigations in four places. In 2011, the same allocation covered investigations in seven places.

Asked what a zero-growth budget would mean in practical terms, ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo said, “No Cote D’Ivoire. No Libya.”

The court’s highest-profile detainee is Ivory Coast’s former President Laurent Gbagbo. The court is due to hold a hearing in June next year to decide whether to confirm charges against him related to violence after disputed elections in Ivory Coast last year.

In Libya, the court has issued arrest warrants for Saif Al-Islam, the son of former leader Muammar Gaddafi, and Abdullah Al-Senussi, the former Libya intelligence chief. It must also investigate complaints against those who supported the uprising, Moreno Ocampo said in an interview with Reuters last week.

Moreno Ocampo noted that three of the countries calling for a cap on the ICC’s budget, Britain, France and Germany, voted in favor of a UN Security Council resolution referring Libya to the court. “States parties referred Libya to us and now they say they can’t pay,” he said.

Not all countries support the budget cap, and some say they would be willing to contribute more. “Certainly African states are not supportive of a zero-growth budget,” said Dire Tladi, legal adviser to the South African Mission to the United Nations.

Many African nations want the ICC to launch investigations in countries outside their continent, where all the court’s current investigations are based.

While the court’s budget is normally adopted by consensus, those involved in the negotiations said it may go to a vote this time. Negotiations, which were scheduled to end last week, are now set to end on Wednesday.

Jonathan O’Donohue of the international justice program at Amnesty International said a budget squeeze would undercut the court’s mission. The ICC must be able to threaten to prosecute if national courts fail to act. If the court cannot bring new cases, its threats will be empty, O’Donohue said.

(Reporting by Rebecca Hamilton)

Concessions since Uprising

Uprisings started 10 months ago in Yemen to demand an end to chronic poverty, rampant corruption and lack of economic opportunity characteristic of the 33-year long rule of its president, Ali Abdullah Saleh. When Mr. Saleh first became Yemen’s president in 1978, the country had suffered two decades of civil war and violence. Mr. Saleh, a former military officer with little formal education is said to have consolidated his power over the years by dividing or co-opting rivals and building a patronage system that he alone controlled, leaving Yemen with a barren political environment and hollow institutions. Since the uprisings against his authoritarian rule started in February, the president has made gradual concessions while still remaining in power. He called for a national unity government, an offer that was turned down. In February, he declared, as did the former Egyptian president prior to his ouster, that neither he nor his eldest son, Ahmed, head of the elite Republican Guard, would run for the next election. This echoed a false claim in 2005 when Mr Saleh promised not to run again, only to change his mind the year after.

On March 20, Mr. Saleh fired his cabinet as demonstrations against him grew. On March 21, some members of his regime such as army commanders and one of the country’s most important tribal leaders began supporting protesters and called for Mr. Saleh’s immediate ouster. Several Yemeni officials resigned from the government, including the mayor of the southern city of Aden. On April 23, Mr. Saleh said he would accept a shift of power to his deputy 30 days from the signing of a formal agreement and grant him and his family, who occupy key positions in Yemen’s security apparatus, immunity from prosecution. This proposal was agreed upon seven months later.

Behind the November 23rd agreement

Seeking an exit strategy, it seems President Ali Abdullah Saleh sought to learn from Yemen’s history and to avoid the fate of the two presidents who had preceded him, both having been assassinated. Saleh signed the U.S.-backed power-transfer deal, brokered by neighboring countries, on November 23rd in the Saudi capital of Riyadh. The deal allows Mr. Saleh to retain his title and certain privileges until new elections are held. Yemeni lawmakers are also expected to pass a law granting him immunity from prosecution. The agreement officially transferred power to his vice president, Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi. Other terms of the agreement include holding elections for a new president set for February 21, 2012 and the creation of a military committee to tackle Yemen’s problems and to “end all of the armed conflicts.” The agreement shows progress in responding the protestors’ demands for democratic transition, as it is the first time Mr. Saleh actually consented to give up formal authority. Yet, questions still remain surrounding other remnants of the regime, as his son and three of his nephews retain powerful posts in the military and intelligence service. While the agreement certainly makes issues at hand, such as Saleh’s avoidance of this fate, easier, it is still unclear as to whether this proposal eases or complicates the Yemeni transition to democracy.

Mr. Saleh’s interest in accepting this proposal is multi-faceted.  One motivation for him to concede power was due in part to threats of sanctions by world powers, in the face of Saleh’s apparent intransigence. Other aspects included financial and travel restrictions; Mr. Saidi, the former United Nations ambassador, said Mr. Saleh had been warned that the Security Council would consider freezing his family assets, and that he might be banned from travel and referred to the International Criminal Court.  Mr. Saleh and his family are believed to have hundreds of millions of dollars in bank accounts and real estate in the United States and Europe. A potential travel ban might have been especially troubling to Mr. Saleh, who may need more treatment for serious wounds sustained in a bomb attack on his presidential palace on June 3rd.

Non-universal Justice
The November 23rd agreement is a favorable exit strategy for the Yemeni president, but what about the Yemeni people? Many protesters in Sana’s “Change Square” said they felt that their popular revolt had been hijacked by political elites and their foreign backers, and were angered by reports that the president and his family would receive immunity from prosecution. Nobel peace laureate Tawakkul Karman was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize this year, along with two other women, for her role in the protest movement that sought Saleh’s ouster. Showing her disapproval of the terms of the treaty agreement, she is advocating for the president’s accountability for crimes committed, stating, “I promised the people in Yemen ... that after they announced I won the Nobel Peace Prize that the first job I will do is taking the file of crimes of Ali Saleh to the ICC”. She is backed by tens of thousands of protesters in Yemen, who have distanced themselves from the formal opposition movement. While Karman has urged the International Criminal Court prosecutor to launch an investigation into the violent crackdown on dissent in Yemen by Saleh, at the same time, she acknowledges the small prospects for this to actually happen, as Yemen is not a signatory state to the Rome Statute, the court’s founding treaty. The only way the prosecutor could launch an investigation is through a recommendation by the United Nations Security Council, as was the case in Libya.
Based on current Yemeni legislation, it seems that crimes beyond those of the president and his family are to go unpunished. On November 27, Mr. Saleh declared a general amnesty for those who had committed wrongdoings during the uprising since it began 10 months ago. It was unclear whether he meant to pardon his own forces accused of killing protesters, or fighters commanded by his rivals during months of bloody fighting. Not exempted from prosecution, however, were those tied to the bombing on his presidential palace in June. Saleh called for those “groups or parties or individuals” responsible to be brought to justice. The incident left him with severe burns to his face and arms and he was taken to Saudi Arabia for treatment.

Future Effects of Yemen’s Revocation of ICC Ratification

The potential role of the ICC in prosecuting crimes in Yemen has taken on a mysterious turn. Back in 2000, Yemen signed the Rome Statute. Following this on March 24, 2007, the Yemeni House of Representatives voted in favor of ratification of the Rome Statute, which would make Yemen a state party to the ICC and place it under the court’s jurisdiction. Yet, in the subsequent procedure of having the president approve the ratification or call for a revote by the Parliament, the Yemeni Parliament voted against the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, retracting the majority vote that had been put in place for it on March 24, 2007. Those who voted against ratification claimed that it was contradicting the constitution and Islamic Sharia, yet rumors have stated that the overwhelming majority of the ruling party had received instructions from President Saleh to cancel their previous vote for the agreement. In light of this recent agreement on November 23rd to grant immunity for President Saleh, one can probably understand the reasons behind the vote back in 2007.  Based on the current terms of the agreement for Saleh’s ouster, only justice without accountability has been achieved, and the viability that this impunity allows for a democratic transition shall be tested in future months as a new government is set to emerge.

Please send any observations or interesting articles to my attention at Nadine@skylightpictures.com or to our Facebook page at https://www.facebook.com/#!/TheReckoningArabic.

Today sees the start of the 10th session of the Assembly of States Parties to the ICC in New York, where he ASP will select six new judges and formalise the consensus candidate for the next Chief Prosecutor of the ICC. To celebrate this momentous occasion in international justice, IJCentral is launching its first ever international justice podcast. This episode includes analysis of what to expect at the ASP from John Washburn and Matthew Heaphy, an interview with the prolific IJ blogger, Mark Kersten, and the latest news from the international justice tribunals. Our host is Hannah Dunphy. Listen to her IJCentral radio debut, and share with your friends.

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The IJCentral Team